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Palavras Chave reconhecimento de padrões, análise comportamental, aprendizagem au-
tomática, monitorização de rede, classificação da actividade de rede.
Resumo Nos dias de hoje, várias organizações enfrentam múltiplas ameaças no inte-
rior da sua rede. Numa época onde as empresas dependem cada vez mais da
informação, estas ameaças podem compremeter seriamente a segurança e a
integridade de dados confidenciais. O acesso não autorizado e o uso de pro-
gramas ilícitos constituem uma forma de penetrar e ultrapassar as barreiras
organizacionais, sendo capazes de propagarem-se para outros terminais pre-
sentes no interior da rede privada com o intuito de atingir dados confidenciais
e segredos comerciais. A eficiência da segurança oferecida pelos sistemas
de defesa tradicionais está a ser posta em causa devido ao elevado número
de ataques de divulgação de dados sofridos pelas empresas. Desta forma,
o desenvolvimento de novos sistemas de monitorização ativos usando inteli-
gência artificial é crucial na medida de atingir uma deteção mais precisa em
curtos períodos de tempo. No entanto, a monitorização e o armazenamento
dos registos da atividade da rede são restritos e limitados por questões le-
gais e estratégias de privacidade, como a cifra dos dados, visando proteger a
confidencialidade das entidades. Esta dissertação propõe metodologias para
inferir padrões de comportamento e revelar anomalias através da análise de
tráfego que passa na rede, detetando pequenas variações em comparação
com o perfil normal de atividade. Delimitado pelas camadas de rede OSI 1
a 4, os dados em bruto são modelados em features, representando observa-
ções de rede e, posteriormente, processados por algoritmos de machine lear-
ning para classificar a atividade de rede. Assumindo a inevitabilidade de um
terminal ser comprometido, este trabalho compreende dois cenários: um ata-
que que se auto-propaga sobre a rede interna e uma tentativa de exfiltração
de dados que envia informações para a rede pública. Embora os processos
de criação de features e de modelação tenham sido testados para estes dois
casos, é uma operação genérica que pode ser utilizada em cenários mais
complexos, bem como em domínios diferentes. O último capítulo inclui uma
prova de conceito e descreve o método de criação dos dados, com a utiliza-
ção de algumas métricas de avaliação de forma a espelhar a performance do
modelo. Os testes mostraram resultados promissores, variando entre 96% e
99% para o caso da propagação e entre 86% e 97% relativamente ao roubo
de dados.

Keywords pattern recognition, behavior analysis, machine learning, network monitoring,
network activity classification.
Abstract Modern corporations face nowadays multiple threats within their networks. In
an era where companies are tightly dependent on information, these threats
can seriously compromise the safety and integrity of sensitive data. Unautho-
rized access and illicit programs comprise a way of penetrating the corporate
networks, able to traversing and propagating to other terminals across the
private network, in search of confidential data and business secrets. The ef-
ficiency of traditional security defenses are being questioned with the number
of data breaches occurred nowadays, being essential the development of new
active monitoring systems with artificial intelligence capable to achieve almost
perfect detection in very short time frames. However, network monitoring and
storage of network activity records are restricted and limited by legal laws
and privacy strategies, like encryption, aiming to protect the confidentiality of
private parties. This dissertation proposes methodologies to infer behavior
patterns and disclose anomalies from network traffic analysis, detecting slight
variations compared with the normal profile. Bounded by network OSI layers
1 to 4, raw data are modeled in features, representing network observations,
and posteriorly, processed by machine learning algorithms to classify network
activity. Assuming the inevitability of a network terminal to be compromised,
this work comprises two scenarios: a self-spreading force that propagates
over internal network and a data exfiltration charge which dispatch confiden-
tial info to the public network. Although features and modeling processes have
been tested for these two cases, it is a generic operation that can be used in
more complex scenarios as well as in different domains. The last chapter de-
scribes the proof of concept scenario and how data was generated, along with
some evaluation metrics to perceive the model’s performance. The tests man-
ifested promising results, ranging from 96% to 99% for the propagation case
and 86% to 97% regarding data exfiltration.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Companies today have a preponderant factor in the economy, both at the nation and worldwide
level, needing a solid structure that supports their expansion, encompassing both architecture
implementations and the social sector. The architecture level includes from the physical
installations to the complex network environment, where the social field, represents the
essence of a company, the workers. Both domains display a hierarchical organization, where
the heterogeneous levels of this ordered chain need to cooperate between them. In this
way, the existence of measures and policies are crucial to coordinate and guide the diverse
elements, either in social as in physical levels, defining the role of each one and directing its
actions, for the company well-being. Progressively it is more arduous to supervise so many
people, that in big companies, could be dispersed across several geographical points. However,
the organization’s watchful eye still focuses on the outside of their edges. Not deferring
importance to the implementation of exterior defense strategies, employees constitute the
main vulnerability of a company (as described in Section 2.2), where most corporate attacks
are prompted by insiders [1], which are careless or have a malicious intention. Human factor
plays a significant role for the network vulnerabilities, where social engineering comprises a
powerful weapon carried by attackers, to target licit users, being those the "open door" for
threats, bypass traditional security mechanisms (discussed along of Section 2.1).
Moreover, technology evolution along with Internet proficiency is transforming the way
how the world is connected, where digital devices are surfacing, allowing companies to take
full advantage and share their services (some of the described in Section 2.1.2) across the
globe. As the scope and business expansion, it is essential that companies have the means
and mechanisms to ensure the secure access to those services, as discussed in Sections 2.1.3
and 2.1.4. Withal, this evolution not only provides a means for the progress. It also empowers
a way to new, more furtive and stealthy attacks that companies need to react and reinforce
their security mechanisms to safeguard the safety and integrity of one of most valuable
assets: the confidential information. Espionage, performed by nation-state actors or simply
by corporation’s competitors, aiming to steal industrial secrets and disclose confidential data
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related to the employee’s records and organization’s plans, is a real scenario that hits all
types of organizations (being the healthcare, financial and industrial fields more affected).
Nowadays, attackers have all the needed resources to break the security walls and spread over
the network, stopping only when their objectives are completed. In this way, data breaches
are an alarming threat that causes a huge impact on organizations, from the loss of reputation
and capital to the disruption of their services. Further, aggressors after violating the network
always leave it untouched and without a trace, due to the detection incapacity of the used
companies security tools.
In an era where the abundance of data is a fact, and the amount of data that travels in
networks is enormous, it becomes increasingly difficult for companies to detect outbreaks
in their premature stage, being crucial to adapt and adopt new strategies that increase the
security, integrity, and availability of a network. Along these lines, as described in Section 2.5
it is possible to extract meaningful information, and therefore knowledge, from the massive
bulk of data using Machine Learning (ML) methodologies (introduced in 2.5.3). This current
and highly popular area, with application in the image, speech recognition and detection
field, including, for example, fraud and network intrusion detection, came to introduce new
solutions that companies need to elevate their network detectability and awareness. However,
it is important to notice that, governments are creating more restrained laws to define new
standards of privacy rights, accompanied with the technical encryption position, aiming to
limit the data gathering action and strengthen the user’s privacy.
The work developed in this dissertation introduces a set of methodologies and procedures
for detecting anomalous communications in corporate networks. The focus is directed inwards,
where spreading threats and data leakage flows to the outside borders are the handled
scenarios. ML provide the tools required to reveal subtle patterns of activities and services
characteristic of an internal corporate network, identifying and distinguishing their nature
between normality and anomaly. Monitoring the environment and gathering the data, without
evading the employee’s privacy or restricting their freedom, enables the behavior analysis of
network activities, so that in the future, such traffic deviations from the normal profile can be
discovered in their earlier stage, preventing the propagation to other terminals and close the
path to confidential assets.
This dissertation was developed at IT - Institute of Telecommunications Aveiro where the
workspace and all required resources were kindly provided.
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CHAPTER 2
Contextualization and State of Art
Information increasingly assumes a more crucial role for companies in an era where data theft
and industrial espionage are recurrent scenarios. New types of attacks are rising and becoming
more imperceptible, leading corporations to not despise outbreaks with internal origins and
adopt new security strategies. In this chapter, an overview of the security mechanisms and
solutions empowered by organizations will be described, along with actual examples that mark
the cybersecurity landscape. It will be introduced the ML concept, that provides an essential
way to infer meaningful information from the huge amount of monitoring data and plays an
imperative role in the anomaly detection area.
2.1 Corporate network security
With network openness and connectivity offered by the Internet, the expansion of sharing data
was a key factor for the rise of enterprise business processes. The enterprise networks aptness of
providing an easy and spontaneous mean for share and distribute resources is vital and crucial
for organizations. Although, it becomes more critical to increase information security. The
protection of private and confidential data, for example, financial and commercial information
in the transactions, is the primary concern to enterprises. According to [2] there are three
major basic information security requirements:
• Confidentiality
• Integrity
• Availability
Confidentiality is the act to ensure that only the appropriate people have access to the
information in question. It is ruled by the principle of the least privilege [3], giving users only
the necessary features to accomplish the task. At the same time that protects data making it
confidential, enacts that only is available to authorized users [4].
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Integrity is the capability to only authorized users change sensitive information, that
is, ensure that the data contents are correct and are not manipulated from unauthorized
people [2].
Availability represents the ability of network information to be readily accessible and
usable to the legitimate users. It means that data should always be attainable whenever a
legitimate user needs [5].
These points form the basic model of information security, the Confidentiality, Integrity,
Availability (CIA) Triad model, as shown in Figure 2.1). The CIA Triad model treats all
the three security elements as equal, aiming a data protection scenario where exists absolute
confidentiality, perfect integrity and perfect availability. However, such a possibility does not
exist in the real world. If a company has a data repository containing commercial information
and the security team has designed a system with strong protected rules by using encryption
methods and implement permissions that restrict the actions for an unauthorized user. The
result is a security plan that has heavy confidentiality and integrity norms, but as this
repository is well secure, users cannot access or use the necessary resources. Usually, as you
increase the levels of security, it occurs the decrease of the productivity levels. On the other
hand, when exists high availability and integrity, many times, the information privacy is put
at risk.
Figure 2.1: CIA triad model
Corporate network security features should protect vital assets. Organizations need to
define their critical data and, consequently, elaborate a set of rules and restrictions related to
the protection of this organizational assets, the security policies. This a high-level document [6]
where companies defined the plan to protect and control their network and data, as guidance
that tell all employees and business partners the correct way for access and manages corporate
network services. This regulation addresses all entities that interact with an organization
network, being necessary in order to define what the enterprise users can do. It restricts
the applications/software that can be used and installed in their computers, establish the
procedures to store and handle with corporate information, and managed the corporation
defense aspects, for example, the mandatory use of anti-virus. Also, organizations need to
define if personal devices (laptops, tablets, and smartphones) are allowed or if users only can
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use the equipments given by the company. This policy, where personal devices are gaining
relevance support by the Bring your own Device (BYOD) tendency, requires more secure
measures [7]. The Internet of Things (IoT) [8], creates a unified network communication
environment, being possible to transfer data between different equipments (like mobile devices,
fridges, dishwasher, printers), increasing the number of devices connected to the network. In
this way, is crucial to forming policies that control these devices regarding access, traffic, and
physical security.
In a network point of view, company administrators must establish security rules on
access, defining the authorization and authentication mechanisms to control internal and
remote access to the corporate network, as well as, in a wireless communication environment
(as will be explained in Section 2.1.3 ). Also, policies associated to switches, routers and
serves [9], along with traffic and monitoring rules should be enacted, e.g., shaping which ports
are allowed, what traffic type and protocols can travel on a corporate network and secure
approaches to transmit data among networks. In fact, it is common practice for companies to
inspect employees’ traffic to filter malware and viruses, prevent the leak of intellectual property.
However, this traffic analysis is conditioned by established rules limiting the inspection scope
(as will be described in Section 2.1.6). On the other hand, to ensure confidentiality and
integrity of the classified/private data such as financial or personal records, companies need
to define encryption mechanisms in order to secure data within the private enterprise network
and in public network (Internet). Data protection is a core security policy that must follow
and preserve the encryption rules defined by each country laws [10], being the inspection of
encrypted traffic an also severe dilemma.
In such a manner, building a security plan is not trivial. Applying string restrict policies
could ensure the desired security, but on the other hand, will limit the user access to information
putting obstacles in their work and causing dissatisfaction.
2.1.1 Corporate network architecture
Internet growing contributed to expanding corporation businesses, where people may be in
different locations, in several departments and organizational structures around the world.
So, corporate networks should ensure that dispersed entities can easily communicate and
share resources as if it were a united environment. However, in order to correctly create a
communication network, the design at an architectural level must be a careful and well-crafted
plan. As follows, this section will cover the relevant concepts the design and implementation
of this networks.
The communication network design must adopt the following requirements to accomplish
all business objectives [11]:
• The network should be resilient, being operational all time, even in the case of failed
links and equipment failure. For example, if for some reason, a network fails, even for a
second, in financial companies may translate many millions lost. In a hospital case, this
may represent lost of lives.
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• The network should be flexible and modulate, being easy to modify and adapt quickly
to business change and evolve and support growth and change, correspondingly.
• The network should ensure the delivery of application in reasonable response times
between hosts.
• The network should be secure, protecting the exchange data and the stored information.
Instead of seen the network as a whole, it is composed by several interconnected components,
applying a layered solution to accomplished the requirements described. A hierarchical network
structure, where each layer has its own functions, breaks the complex problem of network
design into smaller and more manageable areas with fewer devices numbers, being easier to
implement and manage the security policies that define the entire security process. As an
example, with a non-hierarchical network is to control and monitor the network traffic [12].
Figure 2.2 shows a structure of the hierarchical network model divided into three layers.
Local and Remote Workgroup Access
Access
Policy-Based Connectivity
Distribution
Core
High-Speed Switching
Figure 2.2: Hierarchical network design layers [13]
Access layer provides users access to the enterprise network. Generally, a Local Area
Network (LAN) environment 1 grants access to end users, while in Wide Area Network (WAN)
(which covers a broader geographic area [14]), the corporate network access is given for remote
user and sites [13].
The distribution layer is the intermediate point between the access and core layer. Ag-
gregates the data received from the access layer before it is transmitted to the core layer for
routing to its final destination providing policy-based traffic control, where packet inspection
can take place [12].
The core layer, also known as backbone network, is designed to route packets as fast as
possible. Since this layer must provide maximum availability and reliability with minimum
1Type of network that operates over a small physical area where the exchange of information and sharing
of resources are straightforward [14]
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packer processing, it should not perform any packet manipulation [13]. Note that in a
hierarchical model, networks tend to have many single points of failure [11] isolating users
from the wanted service. Thus redundant techniques like alternative paths must be applied
to overcome these issues. The core layer acts as an integration point to the enterprise edge,
data centers, and server farms, where the enterprise edge, usually, contains outside corporate
services (as voice, video, and data). In addition, this layer can be linked to the service
provider’s network, enabling Internet, WAN access and connection to remote sites [13].
To achieve this connectivity the core layer uses routers or multilayer switches, that combine
routing and switching in same devices. The distribution layer, in the same way, usually employs
Layer 3 devices, such as routers or multilayer switches, in order to enforce access control
policies and managing traffic flows [11]. Along with this distribution layer also performs VLAN
routing [11]. Access layer devices are located inside a LAN, communicating through Layer 2
switching via a wired infrastructure, that with cables, connects the disjointed buildings. The
other way is through wireless access point [11].
With the increase of devices that can attach the network, a usual approach used in corporate
environments is VLAN segmentation. It segments the network, enabling the creation of virtual
workgroups based on service, users role or location [11]. So, with the formation of sales,
human resources and engineering workgroups, for example, along with the VLAN to carry a
specified type of traffic (VLAN guest), it is possible to control the access to sensitive data
and resources, according to the end users permissions and rights.
Furthermore, companies must delimit the network’s boundaries to safeguard the "well-
being" of the network and consequently their assets, establishing zones [6]. This architectural
solution, segments networks, associating interfaces that share common functions or features
to which a security policy can be applied. Each zone has an assigned security level based on
the level of trust given, setting the security borders of the network, composed of interfaces
with identical security requirements. It defines a boundary where the traffic is subject to
specific policy restrictions as it crosses to different zones [15]. To support the zoning creation,
firewalls placed at the network border, acting as a barrier between the different security zones
filtering the traffic that flows between them [16]. Typically, organizations divide networks
into three zones: the Trust zone referring to the internal network (the private one), the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the Untrusted zone (composed by the Internet). DMZ or
"semi-protected" zone [11] has a medium trust level, where can accommodate public services
such HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP)/ HTTPS, File Transfer Protocol (FTP) and
Domain Name System (DNS) [17] allowing to be accessible from the untrusted Internet.
2.1.2 Network services
In order to enable communications over the network, it is necessary to assign an IP address
to each device. This can be done automatically incorporating a Dynamic Host Configuration
Protocol (DHCP) server, which controls the attribution process and the management of
addresses pool. Along with DHCP, DNS, which maps Internet domain names into IP
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address [17], providing support and configuration IP services to permit communication in an
enterprise network.
Regarding network management, systems administrators can remotely control the state of
devices, and handle problems related with performance and issues on the network, through
the used of Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) [18] by sending informational
messages. Similarly, Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) (explained in
more detail in Section 2.1.3), when performing accounting function can be used to diagnose
the state of the network [19].
The network offers operational services required to produce work in a corporate such
Email [11], World Wide Web (WWW), Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), video conference,
file and printer sharing. Among the diverse services, this work will give particular emphasis
to file sharing.
2.1.2.1 File sharing
With data becoming a most valuable corporate asset, it is essential to provide storage for
sharing data over an enterprise network. The idea behind file sharing is that the file remains
on the server and is modified by the client, existing only one copy of the file [20]. That
is, having a single copy of file that is used on multiple machines. In this manner, in a
corporate view, there are two main concepts of data storage on the network: Storage Area
Network (SAN) and Network-Attached Storage (NAS). In NAS case, storage devices are
directly attached to IP networks (LAN), being specially developed to file sharing [13], [21],
where multiple workstations can access shared directories and files that are located in a file
server. Instead, in SAN, storage devices are not directly connected to LAN. So, when a host
needs to access data, primarily interacts with servers, which acts as an interconnection point
between workstations and SAN storage devices. Each storage unit is linked to the associated
server over some distance [13], and when hosts request files from serves (which have the notion
of the file system), the server will provide block-level access to shared data storage using Fibre
Channel [13]. Although, for taking advantage of IP networks, communication can be done
through Fiber Channel over Ethernet (FCoE) [22], or using Internet Small Computer System
Interface (iSCSI) [22] that maps block-oriented storage data over TCP/IP networks using
existing IP networks.
On both storage types, typically Network File System (NFS) and Common Internet File
System (CIFS) are mostly used file sharing protocols that allowed LAN hosts access resources
located on the network. NFS is a standard network file system on all Unix/Linux systems
and CIFS, in its turn, is a standard for the Windows operating system; not forgetting of
AppleShare for Macintosh. CIFS is a Server Message Block (SMB) based standard that
extends all the capabilities of SMB. Most of the time they saw as one once CIFS protocol
is a dialect of SMB [23]. Like this, SMB is a Windows network file sharing protocol that
enables sharing of files and printers across nodes on the network. It uses a client-server
implementation, in that, when a client wants a sharing resource on a network, sends a request
message to the server, which will analyze and then forwards a response message. In this way,
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when a computer provides a sharing resource with SMB protocol, it becomes a serve [24].
Likewise, to combat the operation system limitation of SMB/CIFS, Samba [25] has become a
popular free-software that combine the SMB/CIFS network protocol on Unix systems.
2.1.2.2 File transfer
File transfer empowers another manner to exchange file over the network. Although, dissimilar
to file sharing, when a user copies a file to or from a server, one file is kept on the server and
another copy of this file remains on the client. Indeed, not existing the notion of multiple
hosts handle the same file, in fact, the file "travels" between machines.
FTP is the standard for exchange files on the Internet. It works on a server and client-based
architecture not providing encryption rules. In this way, SSH FIle Transfer Protocol (SFTP)
was built to create a more secure way of communication. It runs over SSH protocol (responsible
for providing a secure communication mean as described in Section 2.1.4), establishing a
channel for encrypted transfer information and authentication mechanisms.
For Linux/Unix machines, Secure Copy Protocol (SCP) is another practice for transfer
files over the network. On the same way that SFTP, runs on port 22, that is, works with
SSH, ensuring confidentiality of the data being transferred and protecting authentication.
Nevertheless, in Linux/Unix systems, Remote Sync (Rsync) [20] is a conventional method for
remotely copying and synchronizing files and directories, being primarily used on databases
synchronization and for administrative purposes, since it allows to transfer just the differences
between two sets of files.
Moreover, with WWW popularity, a lot of file transfer is now handled using HTTP. It is
a protocol for transmitting hypermedia documents, originally designed for communication
between web browsers and web servers, that provides a way for users to upload or download
files and pages from the Internet [26]. As will be described in 2.4.1.2, HTTPS is now a
tendency for "reform" the old HTTP, endorsing the communication security on the Internet.
2.1.3 Network Access Control
As new network technologies develop rapidly, users have strong demands for network access
using terminals, anytime, anywhere. However, traditional enterprise campus networks are IP
based networks, manually configured for different office locations, being necessary to apply
network access control policies to verify user’s access rights. So, to ensure control over the
organizational resources, network access control policies are built in authentication - validation
of someone or something (user, equipments or network segments) verifying whether what the
entity claims to be is, in fact, what and who that relay is [4]; and authorization - establishing
what the user should be allowed to do over resources and the user privileges on a system
after have access. This constitutes the Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA),
implemented by RADIUS and Terminal Access Controller Access Control System (TACASC+)
protocols, where all usernames and passwords are keeping in one place, on a central server,
enabling remote access control over the network.
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So, in AAA architecture, RADIUS servers interact with Network Access Server (NAS),
which operates as a RADIUS client, being responsible for sending user information to the
server and return the upon response. Thus, when a host wants to enter the network, requesting
resource access, initiates Ponit-to-point Protocol (PPP) authentication with NAS, providing
the username and password that are sent to RADIUS server. This server supports Password
Authentication Protocol (PAP), Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP),
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [27], or alternately consults an external database
like Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [28] to authenticate a user by verifying
his credentials. With user information retrieval and the configured access policies, the
server forwards a message specifying if authorizes the access. In RADIUS, authentication
and authorization are coupled together, independently of accounting feature, that could be
used for management purposes (2.1.2), indicating the number of resources used and session
duration [29].
When clients are connected to LAN through wireless, the IEEE 802.1X standard defines a
client-server-based access control and authentication protocol in Wi-Fi environment [30], where
each device that wants to attach to a LAN are seen as the supplicant. It has a relation with the
authenticator (such as edge switches or Access Points (APs)), by requesting the identity of a
client (workstation) and, posteriorly, deliver the user information to the authentication server,
usually a RADIUS server. It is responsible for authenticating the user and given, or not,
authorization, transmitting the response back to the authenticator. To pass the authentication
information between the supplicant and the authentication server, EAP is used and handled by
the authenticator, acting as an intermediate point (RADIUS client). Besides, Wi-Fi Protected
Access version 2 (WPA2) (IEEE 802.11i standard), also provides data protection and access
control in wireless LAN connection [31]. Figure 2.3 illustrates the interaction among these
components on the authentication process.
Supplicant Authenticator
Authentication
server
EAP over data-link
EAP over
apllication-
layer 
AAA
protocol
Figure 2.3: IEEE 802.1X Authentication components and process
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However, with the IoT and BYOD tendency (as discussed in Section 2.1), network access
must be controlled similarly as "normal" workstation. This brings a problem since mobility
devices, like printers and phones, may not support 802.1X solution.Thus, to overtake this
problem, authentication could be made based in their MAC address. This is called MAC
Authentication Bypass (MAB) [32] and should be implemented together with IEEE 802.1X.
According to security polices and user’s rights, network devices like switches, can be
dynamically assigned by it respective VLAN to grant access. Therefore, unauthorized access
is blocked, ensuring the security of enterprise resources and assets, by limiting user’s action to
a specified VLAN (guest, sysadmin or others according with the policies) like referenced in
Section 2.1.1.
2.1.4 Secure Communications Channels
Part of a company’s success comes from the ability to communicate between all entities
(as employees and business partners), which in case of having a broad scope, they can be
distributed by several locations. Moreover, after users have been authorized and authenticated
in the network (as described in Section 2.1.3), organizations need to support communications
over different types of networks, being necessary to take into account the security challenges.
Therefore corporations deploy secure communications channels over an unprotected network,
like the Internet, providing three essential data security requirements: origin authentication,
data integrity (2.1) and data encryption to ensure confidentiality (2.1) [11], [13].
The concept "Office from home" [33], where business extends all it is internal resources to
employees that can access them from their homes, is an actual scenario, which corporations
address by employing Virtual Private Network (VPN) solution. It is a private network that
uses a public network to connect users and remotes sites, being essential to ensure the security
data points above described over an unprotected network. VPN can be of two types: remote-
access and site-to-site. Remote-access VPN, enables users to establish a secure connection
from their homes and stations, to the corporate network through the isps! (isps!) [16]. This
is formed by several points of presence (POP), providing access to resources (according to
their permissions), as if they directly plugged to the server. It is enforced using several
protocols: Point–to–Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP), Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP)
over Internet Security Protocol (IPsec) [33], Secure Socket Layer (SSL) or Transport Layer
Security (TLS) [13] and SSH [17].
On the other hand, site-to-site VPN, secure connections between main enterprise and
remote office branches [13], allows stations in multiple locations to exchange secure information
over the public network (Internet). In this VPN type, the most common secure tunneling proto-
col is the IPsec, with some variants like static or dynamic configuration and implementation of
traffic protection using Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) [11]. In both VPN approaches,
IPsec is suitable when two participants want to communicate ensuring authentication and
data encapsulation (encryption). IPsec has two modes, tunnel or transport [11], according to
the way they were implemented: on the ingress router or in the end host, respectively.
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2.1.5 Policy Zone-Based
With the creation of zones (concept elucidated in Section 2.1.1), corporation assets will be
defined by similar security requirements that establish their network borders. Thus, traffic
can flow between different zones, although, cannot be free. For this reason, paths between
zones should establish rules to control traffic that is traveling through them. Firewalls bind
the path between zones, acting as "check points", in which, the packets that travel between
security zones are confronted with the security policies implemented, filtering the packets that
obey to the corporation policy, from other ones, that should be dropped.
Packet inspection and filtering are one of most fundamental functionalities of a firewall.
It is controlled by security policies, that supervises the inbound traffic based on source
and destination, preventing connections from an unprotected network (Internet) to enter
the private LAN. If a web server is placed on a trusted zone, administrators, for example,
only permit traffic from Internet HTTP native from port 80. Yet, security policies apply to
outbound traffic, preventing employees from accessing forbidden content and places on the
Internet that are in a blacklist. On the other hand, it establishes rules for tracking the IP
addresses that have the authorization to connect with outside networks. This intermediate
points can also control bandwidth usage per user or desktop, according to the policy.
These filtering capabilities performed by a firewall are conditioned by the type of packet
inspection. It can filter all the packets performed by a statically set of rules, that looks inside
each packet, checking the source/destination addresses and ports (and sometimes protocol),
but, without connection notion [16] - stateless filtering. More recent firewall generation
supported by most vendors, Check Point [34], Cisco [16] and Juniper Networks [35], perform
a stateful packet filtering, which incorporates the concept of connection and state [6]. It
treats all packets belonging to one connection as a data flow, instead of isolated entities as in
stateless filtering, where a session is dynamically created for the first packet, and, the firewall
will allow data back based in that connection.
2.1.6 Monitoring
At a corporate level, the concept of monitoring usually considers logging entrance to surveillance
systems, to prevent entry of unwanted entities. The same happens on networks, but not so
direct and straightforward. Audit and supervise the network well-being, requires the analysis
and, subsequent, understanding of network traffic.
Due to today’s attacks [36], firewalls cannot give full access control over the network,
since this threats can overtake the security policies by misleads of the inspection mechanisms
(described in Section 2.1.5), as the case of Internet Protocol (IP) and Media Access Control
(MAC) spoofing or the smurf attack. So, another level of security is needed, gathering data
and detecting intruder’s activities that violate the established rules.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) is seen as a primary defense along with the firewalls [37],
exposing unauthorized and harmful activities, being able to act at host level (Host-based
Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDS)) [38], or the network level (Network-based Intrusion
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Detection Systems (NIDS)). The later monitors the network traffic that can be a system
threat [37], reading all incoming packets and trying to find any suspicious pattern. It spots
intrusion activities based on a set of rules or signatures of known attacks. This exposure
mechanism is known as Misuse-based or Signature-based detection. Although, when faced
with new malevolent forms, unknown by the system, it will never detect them [39]. Once
each intrusive activity is uniquely represented by a pattern or a signature, this mechanism is
efficient in detecting recognized attacks [17]. However, because of the time that the signature
databases had until patch the new pattern, it is not efficient for unidentified attacks [37].
On the other hand, an Anomaly-based detection mechanism can be more adjustable in
a way that it can learn with the malevolent intruder forms. It builds a profile with normal
activity and checks for deviations with the natural profile, using ML (explained in Section
2.5.3), statistical and knowledge-based techniques (as discussed in Section 2.5) [37], [40].
Based on the behavior of the attacks, and dissimilar to Signature-based monitoring, it can
detect new pattern activities that do not know, but has a crucial constraint: it assumes that
all intrusive actions are necessarily anomalous [41], leading to the occurrence of false positives
2 [42].
The control of unauthorized access and the maintenance of the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of information (2.1), is not complete by only using a security system with
IDS [43]. After being noticed, it is necessary to act and take several measures to stop the
attack from spreading and reach the terminal points where valued assets are. This passive
mode does not eliminate the threat. It only stores the log audits and informed administrators,
who has the responsibility to decide how to deal with those signs [43].
In contrast, Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) also monitors the traffic and alerts when
it discovers some anomaly, but takes a proactive action by dropping the malicious packets and
block the illegal traffic. The goal is to stop attacks that reach a host or a private network [44],
at the same time that logs the malicious data [45]. Like IDS, the prevention can be divided
into Host-based Intrusion Prevention Systems (HIPS) (where prevents the entry of attack
into an individual host) and Network-based Intrusion Prevention Systems (NIPS) (prevents
and identifies attacks at the entry point) [14]. So, an IPS typically is an IDS that can detect
and prevent attacks [11], combining firewall capabilities for selecting acceptable traffic based
on defined rules, and inspecting capabilities by probing the packets sent from the firewall [6],
to stop attacks in real time [44].
IPS and IDS go beyond the standard packet inspection (also known as SPI), which examines
both source and destination address, port number and, sometimes goes deeply, inspecting also
protocols (Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP)) [16],
[46], limited by the transport layer of Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model (illustrated
in Figure 2.4). The goal of a more in-depth inspection is to deny the packets that bypass the
firewalls and carry malicious content that goes unnoticed. DPI provides application inspection,
looking in detail at the contents of data payload that are being sent, operating at Layer 7 of
OSI model (Figure 2.4). However, the deepness of monitoring can also be an issue and rise
2Anomalous activities that are not intrusive but are flagged as one
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legal concerns. For example, Internet Service Provider (ISP) can monitoring network traffic
to find malicious virus, yet, many times, the personal information data is sold to marketing
and advertising companies [47]. Between those two extremes is a ’grey area’ where the privacy
violation is an intensely debated point [48], [49], being encryption of data a vital concern to
corporations, and a rising tendency [50], which aims to protect data privacy, but at the same
time, becoming harder to detect spiteful activity directly [51].
Figure 2.4: Comparison between scope of SPI and DPI on OSI model
Concentrating on intrusion from outside the networks is a good practice to prevent
unwanted accesses, but at the same time, internal network activities should not be ignored
(as will see in more detail in Section 2.2). Nearly every computing devices have the capability
of producing logs which can express, for example, authentication records or failed password
attempts. So, these audit messages must be collected and stored in appropriate places like
remote servers for security and analysis purposes. Monitoring and reviewing audit records
permit companies spot and prevent a breach in its premature stage. Also, it is common that
network and system administrators use log records, even after some hours after, to understand
what has happened and fix the problem source. However, the larger the organization, the
more logs there are what is a significant obstacle concerning management. In this way, instead,
IPS that only see IP addresses, packets and protocols, empower a log monitoring solution can
give a forensic analysis over the network and an event correlation.
2.2 Corporate network threats
Even when organizations have the most protected and elaborate security system, there will
always be an "open door" or a mistake that will cause vulnerability for attackers to take
advantage off, in the way that perfect security never can be reached [17].
A threat or network attack occurs from an attacker who seeks to find and exploit vulnera-
bilities, trying to harm a system or disrupt normal business operations. So, vulnerabilities
are defined as weak points or loopholes in security that an aggressor exploits in order to gain
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network access or to reach resources on the network. Thereby, a threat may exist, but if there
are no vulnerabilities for the threat to exploit, then there would be no risk [2].
It is important to distinguish who or what and the goal of these threats that outbreaks
the enterprise networks. Attackers can be seen as unauthorized users of the system that
cracks the secure barrier - external attackers. Whereas, internal intruders are those that have
permission to access the system [14].
The first type that constitutes the external threats is mainly represented by criminal
hackers, hacktivists, nation-state actors (attacks sponsored by governments) [2] or enterprise
competitors. Intruders are no longer motivated by notoriety. Instead, economic or political
gain and government/industrial espionage are the actual causes [9]. This shift enables the
creation of new malicious forms making intruders always one step ahead. It also came to
alter the mode completely how they act, as said by Heidi Shey, Senior Analyst at Forester,
“Hackers are carefully picking their victim organization, learning its businesses, understanding
its partner relationships, and testing for weaknesses and vulnerabilities” [52]. New methods are
continually emerging in volume, variety, and velocity [53], exploring unknown and undiscovered
vulnerabilities. Due to this fact, and because there is a discrepancy between what an intruder
knows and what the defender recognize to defend against these threats [54], are known
as zero-day attacks and are one most challenging tasks to enterprise network security [55].
To emphasize, public identified vulnerabilities are listed in Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures (CVE) helping companies to mitigate the known weak points [56]. Furthermore,
the actual cyber intrusions are becoming stealthier and persistent [57] using more sophisticated
tools. Invaders are opting for targeted attack mode [58], [59], as shown in Figure 2.5, comparing
to the traditional attacks methods.
Figure 2.5: Traditional vs. advanced attacks
After differentiating the external from internal attackers, was given a small enhancement
to the internal threats, which is usually the basic behavior of almost all companies [60]. The
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traditional network architectures were built by placing the jewels of the crown (the company
assets) in a well-guarded castle. Organizations think that a secure perimeter protects all
critical resources and nothing can pass. What if an unauthorized entity is already inside the
castle?
Old fashion cybersecurity thoughts, that direct the focus of the defense to outside attacks,
keep assuming that the danger only has external origins [61]. It also claims that the outside
network, unlike the private network, is the one that is unprotected and a danger for corporations.
This differentiation, where everything within the boundaries of an organization is considered
to be reliable, and everything else (such as the Internet) is considered as untrusted, and in
today’s world, it is not entirely true.
According to the Clearswift Insider Threat Index (CITI) annual report 2017 [1], 74%
of security incidents came from the extended enterprise, demonstrating that, nowadays,
insider threats are a huge risk for companies. Insider users having permissions to access the
organizational system, which can be considerate an employee, contractor or other trusted third
party [60]. However, according to the privileges, they are divided into two groups, malicious
insider (or intentional insider) and accidental (or non-malicious insider) [60], [61].
The first type is an insider that uses their privileges intentionally to compromise the
corporate network, system, and data, affecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability
(2.1) [62] or physical well-being of the organization’s information [63]. Usually, their motivations
are personal or financial gain, espionage or a mean for revenge [60]. As an example of malicious
insider is the case of Edward Snowden, National Security Agency (NSA) contractor who stole
information and provided it to the media, as well as, likely to Russia and China [64].
The other type, are within users that involuntary and accidentally can cause damage and,
by mistake without bad intent, open breaches in the system, compromising the confidential
enterprise data [65], [66]. Currently, these non-malicious users are considered as the most
abundant threat in an organization ecosystem, as the Ponemon Institute shows in 2016 Cost
of Insider Threats Study [67], that among 874 incidents reported by companies 568 were
caused by an employee or contractor negligence. Due to this fact, employees comprising
a vulnerability source to the company’s security, empowering attack vectors for malicious
insiders and external adversaries gaining system access [63]. Outsider attackers do not have
authorized permissions, so, they maneuver the insider users as "puppets" to gain entry and
to accomplish their purposes. In insider-threat literature [65], [68], this type is classified as
masquerade insider.
2.3 Attack objectives and methodology
Once an intruder causes a breach in the system, one of most severe threats to companies
is the data theft or leakage, formally referred as data exfiltration [69]. As defined in [70],
is an illegal transport of data from within an organization to an external destination, that
may cause substantial financial and reputation damage by disclosing trade secrets, project
futures plans, and national secrets if at governmental level [69]. A significant data leakage
16
is the attack to Equifax, being one of the biggest data breacher ever notice [71] remaining
undiscovered for weeks, where 143 million American’s personal information was stolen [72],
along with Target Corporation’s incident (2013) [73], where a massive amount of credit and
debit card numbers were compromised. In data breach’s sequence, film companies in recent
years have been the primary target, from Sony’s data breach [74] to the famous ransom attack
to HBO’s company [75], where the attackers stole multiple episodes of Game of Thrones show,
demanding to HBO payment in order to not release the upcoming episodes. Most of times
information of this attacks is restricted and not disclosed by the attacked companies.
Not all leakage is related to data/information. Resource leakages, where attackers effec-
tively are not stealing anything more than computer power from their victims (CPU power
and its requisite electricity) for Cryptomining (cryptocurrency mining) [76] 3, could cause
an impact on business operations [77]. In the same way, spam campaigns could also use the
computer’s resources to broadcast without the consent of the owner.
Still, not all attacks are stealing-based. Not being the focus of this work, Denial of Service
(DoS) is responsible for causing service disruption making company’s services unavailable to
its legitimate users. These attacks interfere with the availability component that corporations
must ensure (2.1), where reputation impact and loss of market are the consequences that can
be extremely costly. Driven by the increasingly large number of vulnerable systems, attackers
could launch a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), which uses a large number of computers
to coordinated a DoS attack against a single machine or multiple victim machines [78]. Mirai’s
botnet caused disruption of the Internet targeting Dyn company, one of the biggest DNS
providers (service introduced in Section 2.1.2) [79].
The year of 2017 was the ransomware’s year. It was verified a colossal increasing grow of
ransomware as a computer crime hitting all types of organizations [80]. It all starts with the
famous and fiercely WannaCry (also known as WannaCrypt) attack that shut down computers
all over the world, as Figure 2.6 illustrates, changing the way of ransom acts and how it was
seen, becoming the first "ransomworm" ever seen. This malware, blocks access to a computer or
its data, using encryption techniques and demands money (generally in Bitcoins) to recover it.
This is the behavior of common ransomware. The worm capability is what makes it unique and
allows it to spread around the Internet. Wannacry took advantaged of Eternalblue, one of the
several NSA exploitation tools (such as EternalChampion, EternalRomance, Eternalsynergy,
and so on) leaked by an anonymous group calling itself Shadow Brokers [81]. These tools
are based on multiples vulnerabilities in the Windows implementation of SMB protocol and
allowed this worm propagate through the network using SMBv1/SMBv2 vulnerabilities. It is
important salient the spread action mode of this worm. It checks the IP address of the infected
machine and attempts to connect to TCP port 445 (SMB) of each host in the same subnet
and also spread to the Internet by generating a random IP address. When the incursion
gains access and starts to run in the machine, it contacts a domain, the killswitch (i.e., event
that is used to stop a program from continuing to execute) domain found by accident. It
attempts an HTTP GET request to the domain: if it succeeded, the intrusion stops, otherwise,
3Currently, the most valuable currency to mine with standard systems is Monero
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the incursion continues [81], [82]. Besides, Wannacry utilized a Doublepulsar backdoor for
established persistence and installed the ransomware payload in the infected machine (the
malware executable that encrypts the files).
The exposure of NSA exploits and hacking tools, not only caused a significant impact
across several corporations such the US delivery company FedEx, the Spanish Telefonica
and several UK hospitals [83] (relative to WannaCry’s impact), but opened the way to
new attacks becoming more "virulent" using the vulnerability in SMB protocol (patched
by Microsoft, MS17-010 [84]) for spreading, like Bad Rabbit [85], NotPetya [86]; and more
recently RedisWannaMine [87].
Figure 2.6: Heatmap of the areas most affected by Wannacry attack 11:07 AM, 12 May 2017 [88]
NotPetya is a complementary version of Wannacry. Both uses Eternablue exploit for
spreading and encrypt files demanding bitcoins to recover them, and in NotPetya, other leaked
exploitation was used: EternalRomance. However, it does not depend exclusively on SMBv1
vulnerably for spreading. If the target was already patched with MS17-010 vulnerability,
Notpetya ransomware empowers password harvesting tools (like the open source Mimikatz),
that are delivered and used by PsExec and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI),
both Window’s legitimate tools, for lateral movement infecting new machines on the same
LAN [89]. Therefore, this improved version was designed only to spread internally (in a
LAN) and not on the Internet, like Wannacry was. The initial infection was using a software
update for M.E.Doc 4, where attackers wanted to contaminate every foreign organization that
did businesses with Ukraine. Thus, seems that Wannacry was a a destructive action, once
initially infecting small amount of machines, but spreading in world scale, whereas NotPetya
at the beginning infected a vast network but was limited to the internal corporate network
confines [90].
The cyber security landscape has changed. Compared with traditional attacks, new
exploits are designed to have a global impact within minutes, using persistent and stealthy
4Popular accounting software used by Ukrainian companies
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actions, as demonstrated in Figure 2.5. Based on reported incidents [91]–[93], many high-
profile organizations have experienced a new kind of cyber attacks, Advanced Persistent
Threats (APTs). These cyber attacks aim to penetrate a system, slowly, and without causing
any harm at first, but always with the final goal in mind: strike and becoming too late for
the infected system to recover or prevent the attack. The INFOSEC Institute estimates
that advanced cyber attacks can stay inside a network for more than 200 days on average
before being discovered [94]. Therefore, this section will describe the several phases which
characterize these serious threats.
2.3.1 Knowledge acquisition
Before launching the intrusion, attackers study the vulnerabilities of their target. Since it can
be anyone in an organization, from employees to administrators, invaders search and gather
useful information about them. Social engineering as defined in [95] is “one of the simplest
methods to gather information about a target through the process of exploiting human
weakness that is inherited to every organization”, in order to pose a trusted insider. Performed
by masquerade insiders (a concept discussed in Section 2.2), external attackers take advantage
of company’s users that have authorization and permissions. They employ several simple
techniques from direct knowledge of the company’s secure facilities and organizational structure
to simple listen employee’s conversations. Although, such direct approaches sometimes do
not work. So, more elaborate methods like crawling company’s websites, mailing lists, social
networks, and dumpster diving, are used in a search for valuable information such as personal
data and valid credentials [96].
Once the target is identified and studied, the next step is to find a flaw that allows the
attackers to gain access. This is usually accomplished by scanning an organization’s network
and environment to find security holes and "open doors" granting a way for the attacker to
come in.
2.3.2 Infiltration
When the target network weaknesses are known, intruders, start looking for an initial ex-
ploitation to find a way to get inside the network. Using the information collected in the
previous phase (2.3.1), and once again, applying social engineering tricks to luring insider
users, taking advantage of their goodness and ingenuousness, empowers a way for intruders
gain access. Phishing is the most common and effective attack vector, where "normal" emails
or instant messages, containing most of the time, malware attached or embed links to redirect
users to suspicious websites [97]. Phishing exploits the curiosity and empathy of users, gaining
their trust through faking the identity of higher entities such as enterprise superiors, bank
and judicial personalities (impersonation); or, on the other hand, by intimidating, leading
them to open these poisoned attachments. With the increasing popularity of social networks,
phishing attacks are changing their delivered methods, using more sophisticated techniques
targeting particular individuals or groups [96], rather than the old fashioned spam way, the
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Spear-phishing. Also, watering hole attacks [98], that fabricate websites, stealthily redirect
users to another site, infecting the machine with injected malware. The malicious software
that compromises the user’s machines and gives the attacker a foot in the door can be simple
trojans, rootkits or keyloggers. This first occurrence of malware does not necessarily cause
any damage by itself. Its purpose is to infect further machines, and to wait for the remotely
triggered deploy, implementing the Propagation phase, that will be elucidated in Section
2.3.4. Notice that, the malware samples could exploit known CVE, or, contrary, zero-day
vulnerabilities.
Other straightforward ways, including deceiving the enterprise concierge, to gain access
into the installations, by searching post-it notes (where users wrote there passwords) and
unlock computer’s, to simple infection via contaminated hardware. Baiting is a technique that
mines the user’s curiosity putting, for example, top-secret labels on stored devices that are
infected with some malware [96] or placing them in a tempting place. So, users, in analogy to
mouses, falls into the trap and yielded to temptation, opening the content of this devices.
In major Target data breach, discussed in Section 2.3, according to [73], attackers gain
access into Target’s network, exploiting the weak point found on Fazio Mechanical Services
System 5, using a trojan initially installed through a phishing attempt. In similar lines, Stuart
McClure, CEO of computer security firm Cylance, in an interview for the POLITICO [99],
affirmed that in Sony’s attack (2.3) hackers got inside across phishing emails with a forging
link of Apple website asking for logon ID and password of staff. On the hopes that people
were using the same password for work and personal accounts, posteriorly, attackers searched
into LinkedIn for the victim’s profiles to deduced Sony network logon IDs.
2.3.3 Learning
The initial onset of malware delivery (2.3.2) is to:
• Establish a foothold into environments that the attackers do not control.
• Gain access to an individual machine on network.
• In case the main target has not yet been reached, obtain information of such network
hierarchy and segmentation 2.1.1, the running services 2.1.2 or internal servers accessed by
the compromised computer to staying undetected over prolonged periods and accomplish
their goals.
Following the Target breach analysis [73], after compromise Fazio Mechanical and found a
door into the Target’s network, attackers perform a kind of inside knowledge acquisition, in
order to understand the network and determine which systems need to be compromised [2].
This learning process will help the attacker to map the network and acquire intelligence about
their next move. Network tools to find active connections, open ports (e.g., Netstat [100]) and
scanning the network (e.g., Nmap [101]) are readily available to intruders. Furthermore, it
can also steal login credentials from computers that deal with valuable information, normally
performed by the company’s administrators, power the attacker’s movement across the network.
5Third party vendor, which is a heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning firm
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Notice that, social engineering methods, once again, can be used to obtain this necessary
credentials.
2.3.4 Propagation
After the Learning phase (2.3.3), attackers will have all they need to escalate privileges to
an admin level and start infecting others machines in order to reach the end target. This
process of expansion is commonly known as lateral movement [102], [103] where intruders
progressively spread through a network looking for high-value data inside the network. One of
the final goals of this work is to recognize and posteriorly prevent/stop this contagious move.
The propagation behavior marks the action mode of the today’s attacks, where the goal is
to infect the most significant number of machines, but, at the same time, remaining discrete
and unknown for as long as possible. WannaCry and NotPetya ransomware (described in
Section 2.3) spread mode shows the magnitude of propagation across the entire world, staying
unstoppable for some time. Also, the cyber espionage Stuxnet’s worm, that invaded Iran’s
nuclear facilities, infected more than 50.000 Windows computers, even if they were oﬄine [104].
The initial infection may have been caused by a hand-held Universal Serial Bus (USB) device
that carried the attack code [93], [104]. Stuxnet did not spread indiscriminately. It identified
a specific target to take control of centrifuges, erasing the track, by providing false feedback
to outside controllers [105]. This complex action mode allows to be undetected over a ten
months [93].
Most of the times, propagation is associated with the establishment of persistence [102], in
which threat actors create additional points granting a way to remotely execute instructions
and install malware over command and control channels (C&C), using remote access tool
(RAT) [59] or backdoors [65]. With a stealthy and undercover spreading, attackers can travel
among the network and obtain access to the desired target, where are the valuable assets.
2.3.5 Exfiltration
When aggressors finally reach the goal, it is time to send, confidential or secret information
from an infected or attacker-controlled target system, to outside of the company’s network
where the attacker’s machine is. The identification of data exfiltration action also is one of
the primary goals of this dissertation, namely, consider the disability of security and monitor
mechanisms to detect this illegal data transport. The effectiveness of the exfiltration lies in the
attacker’s ability not to leave a footprint, remaining undetectable. It can be challenging for
monitor systems to discern the traffic that carries the sensitive data from the normal traffic,
once attackers take advantage of the increased encrypted traffic used in communications as
described in Section 2.1.4.
To compress and mask the exfiltrated traffic, a channel between the infected and intruder
machine is created, where the aggressor, within the several existing possibilities, lays on data
transfer protocols, e.g., FTP, HTTP (and the secure version using SSL, i.e., HTTPS), DNS
and email [106] to exchange the information. With steganography techniques, it is possible to
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hide information within images, audio, video files [107] becoming more difficult to detect, as
happened in Shamoon attack to Saudi Arabia oil producer’s, where user’s credentials were
hidden in a JPEG image [108].
2.3.5.1 Aggregation
The exfiltration’s success depends on the intruder’s obscure capacity. To make detection more
arduous, the covert channel, may not transfer sensitive data to the external network directly.
The exfiltration process could be a multi-phase stage, composed by more than one hop, where
at some point, the data collected is aggregated and sent to the final destination. This is what
happened on Target’s attack [73], [109]. The infected terminals sent data to a compromised
internal staging server, where it was stored and aggregated until it was a suitable time to
transmit to the attacker. Later, was found that the credit card information, was sent in bulk
to a compromised FTP server belonging to a third party and finally pushed to legitimate
sites.
2.4 Monitoring
The increase of volume traffic along with the attacks escalation and diversity, rises company’s
concerns being network monitoring a key point to managing an environment. In this way
network monitoring and information security walk side by side. However, with the increasing
of network data volume, it is unreasonable and unpractical for network sensors to collect all
traffic that travels in the environment. Specifying and filtering the meaningful information
becomes vital for better auditing, and posteriorly, being easier to analyze the acquired data
and not overload the storage units.
Traffic volume data is noisy. It contains packets that carry non-relevant information and
can be ignored. Despite existing several network protocols, the majority of traffic is originated
from the TCP, UDP and Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) protocols [110].
2.4.1 Active vs Passive monitoring
The monitoring of network health requires data acquisition, and it is essential to distinguish
the two primary techniques: active and passive monitoring. Passive mode analyzes the network
traffic for a specific time and reports the results. Active monitoring, implants test packets
to measure the performance and availability of network services, i.e., how fast the packets
travel through the network. Active monitoring relies on the injecting capacity of test packets,
generating data to evaluate particular aspects of network performance. Since it introduces
extra traffic in the environment, it performs real-time monitoring. On the other hand, passive
monitoring, audits historic data, providing a performance overview of the whole network.
Both approaches have their strengths and drawbacks. Passive mode collects a larger
volume of heterogeneous data and can cause overhead to networking hardware. Instead, active
monitoring gathers smaller amounts of data and can act inside or outside of the network
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environment, in place of passive monitoring, that only measures internal traffic, limited to the
network that the device is connected. Thus, active auditing is ideal for measure a specific
network metric, ensuring good Quality of Service (QoS) practices, and passive examination is
useful to handle large data volumes, capable of establishing bandwidth and traffic standards
(based on the usage history). Considering that it analyzes data for a long time, it can more
easily profile the network traffic identifying potential security threats [111].
2.4.1.1 Active Monitoring
Active tests detect real-time network and application problems like end-to-end reachability,
packet loss, and jitter. Some examples of active monitoring tools and techniques will be
described below [112]:
• SNMP
As referenced in 2.1.2, SNMP permits to manage the network performance finding and
solve problems. This protocol had three main components: Managed devices, Agents and
Network Management System. The managed devices are network nodes (such as routers,
switches, printers, and so one) that support SNMP and integrate the agent. Further, the
agent is a software that can access and deal with the management information, acting
as interpreter between the managed device and the Network Management System, that
coordinates all the managed devices through SNMP.
• ICMP
This protocol can diagnose and determine the reachability and availability of a
network device likewise as it is also used to infer the delay and loss of packets.
• Syslog [20]
Each device (machines, routers, hubs, etc.) is continuously confronted with a logging
system message that will notify with a response. The logging data is stored in a central
repository reporting system status and usage information.
In common all the describe methods generate some input in the network using it to invoke
information or perform some test. Although, some additional tools merely generate extra
traffic to measure the network state:
• Ping and traceroute
Useful to estimate delay time and packets loss. Both check the reachability of IP
hosts through ICMP packets.
• Iperf
A software tool which measures the maximum achievable bandwidth in the network,
as well as, packet loss and delay jitter [113].
2.4.1.2 Passive Monitoring
Passive monitoring does not introduce extra packets in the environment, instead only collects
the traffic that travels in the network during a particular time. There are two approaches to
extract the travel data: Switch Port Analyzer (SPAN) and network TAP.
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SPAN, alias port mirroring, copies packets flowing among different ports and entering
VLAN to a common interface that can be placed on a remote host - the mirror port. Usually,
it is implemented in switches (as well as in routers) not being required additional hardware,
and the duplicate traffic posteriorly is analyzed to enforcing policies, detecting intrusions,
monitoring and predicting traffic patterns. Relatively to performance questions, mirror traffic
can be from multiple ports, exceeding the mirror interface capacity (resulting in dropped
packets). A typical procedure to avoid this degrading factor is limiting the number of interfaces,
and VLAN monitored. Another and more robust solution is to incorporate a firewall to filter
traffic sending only the necessary packets to mirror [114].
Network TAP also mirrors traffic but using a dedicated hardware device placed on a cable
infrastructure between network devices (such as firewalls, routers, and switches), as shown
in Figure 2.7. Instead of copying the traffic data to a specific port, it duplicates packets
directly on cables. The TAP device should be placed in secure locations and can be of two
types: passive or active. Passive TAP does not consumes its power capacity and does not
interacts directly with other network elements. It implements an internal splitter mechanism,
supported by switch ports where network traffic flows; and monitoring ports, which are used
to transmit the signals of duplicate packets. This separation does not interfere with original
data that flows on the network, safeguarding that every each packet is mirrored and eliminates
the possibility of oversubscription (which can happen in SPAN). Oppositely, active TAP,
upon receiving a message, it instantly retransmits traffic for the network and monitoring
destinations (without split criterion) and requires their power source to perform the task.
Indeed, if a power outage happens, active TAP represents a failure network point (although
advanced techniques already handle with this power problem) [115].
Concluding, although TAP presents better arguments about the port mirror, the choice of
the monitoring solution depends on the situation in question. TAP are expensive equipments
that drive companies to spend extra money, not forgetting of the inconvenience when opening
and moving cables during installation or re-installation. On the other hand, port mirror does
not introduce extra monetary resources, and it only depends on the switch port capacity. So,
in the scope of this work, monitoring of the network welfare is a port mirroring solution, once
switches have the responsibility to forward the packets to their destinations, and at the same
time, could control the traffic of a single and required VLAN.
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Network
TAP
Figure 2.7: Network TAP settled in direct cables between two switches. All the traffic that travels
through the cables are duplicated into the TAP device.
After the data has been collected from various point within the network, it is time for
traffic analysis on the data. A packet by packet is impractical due to the system’s latency
and the amount of both software and hardware needed. Instead, a statistical approach is a
good starting point to extract information (an approach that will be discussed in Section 3.2).
Although, it is essential to always have in mind the OSI model (Figure 2.4). As you move
higher up into the model, traffic sniffing becomes more complex, and the consequent packet
inspection rises legal issues [116]. Currently, the network has been experienced the increase in
average volume of encrypted Internet traffic as illustrated in Figure 2.8.
Figure 2.8: Percentage of web pages loaded by firefox using HTTPS [117], representing the increase
of the Let’s Encrypt popularity.
The old fashion HTTP was suppressed by HTTPS in web encryption searching for a
more secure protocol. This movement supported by Let’s Encrypt 6, sponsored by the most
prominent companies (e.g., Cisco, Facebook and Akamai), has transformed the composition of
web traffic [118]. It becomes more difficult to analyze network data, once session encryption
6Organization that are helping millions of sites add HTTPS to their sites for free
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at layer 6 makes data unreadable, and at layer 6/7, information of protocol in use is needed
for extracts relevant knowledge [110]. Thus, in the scope of this dissertation, data collected is
subsequently analyzed between layer 3 and 5 of OSI model (without deep packet inspection
2.1.6), extracting meaningful material to be used in ML methods for classification and detecting
traffic patterns of invasion activities.
2.5 Knowledge Extraction
As argued throughout this thesis, companies increasingly manufacture and extensive bank
amounts of data. Analyzing and pull out something with meaning from that collection of data
is not a trivial process. In this way, Data Mining (DM) has played an important role in the
information era. DM is a process of extracting useful material from large data sets, crucial to
discover underlying patterns. It can be perceived as an essential to knowledge extraction.
In a monitored network enterprise, samples collected from monitoring process (discussed in
Section 3.2) will be manipulated to generate patterns that define the network action. However,
the data must be prepared and treated before processing. After the cleaning process, statistical
network observations are conducted to ML algorithms, that are capable of extracting relevant
knowledge from the meaningless data, translating the objective of this thesis.
Moreover, in this section will be presented an overview of some knowledge extraction
techniques used to audit and infer the network status. So, in an anomaly-based network
intrusion detection, as described in Figure 2.9, the system is trained with samples from the
monitoring traffic in order to generate a model that, afterward, is used to classify new events
as atypical or not [119]. How the information is extracted from the model’s fabrication is what
distinguishes the anomaly detection techniques: [120]: knowledge-based (2.5.1), statistical-
based (2.5.2) and ML-based (2.5.3).
Monitored
environment
Intrusion
report
ModelTraining
Target 
systems 
instances
Detection
Figure 2.9: Schema of necessary steps to transform the collected data into knowledge and, posteriorly,
intrusion detection.
26
2.5.1 Knowledge-based
Knowledge-based techniques are performed by most IDS (both anomaly-based and misuse-based
2.1.6), where network events are checked against predefined rules or patterns of attack, to
easily recognize and handle with already experienced attacks. Monowar Bhuyan et al. in [14]
split this technique into:
• Expert systems
• Rule-based
• Ontology-based
• Logic-based
• State-transition analysis
An example of a rule-based detection system is the open-source Snort [121], where each
packet is observed according to a set of rules that can identify attacks based on IP addresses,
TCP or UDP port numbers and ICMP codes [14]. However, these approaches requires a
manually rule insertion, when new types of malicious traffic are observed and is crucial for
anomaly detection a completeness monitor system that automatically and autonomously
"learns" with new attacks signatures.
2.5.2 Statistical-based
Statistical view over the network traffic can be a simple approach showing, for instance, the
most used ports and addresses, flow size or the number of packets for each protocol. This
statistical metrics (e.g., mean and variance) are used to create a statistic model that represents
the normal behavioral of network traffic, that is, a profile that represents its stochastic
behavior [120]. Then, the monitoring data is compared with learned model, looking for unseen
anomalous instances that have low probability to be generated from it. Statistical models
usually are sustained on the following categories [122]:
• Operational Model or Threshold Metric
• Markov Process Model or Marker Model
• Statistical Moments or Mean and Standard Deviation Model
• Multivariate Model
• Time Series Model [123]
Despite not requiring prior knowledge of normal activities of the target system, some
drawbacks should be pointed out. Once the building of a model is a prolonged process, it takes
a long time to report the prime anomaly. Moreover, the selection of parameters and metrics is
not a trivial process [14]. Furthermore, the network environments produce large datasets with
high dimensional data. Along with this, the network is a dynamic environment composed by
very differentiated data. Thus, statistical models can not address these problems [119], being
necessary a self-learning system capable of adapting to a dynamic network environment and
with high computationally efficacy to handle with these large sized inputs. Note that, in many
cases, the applicability of ML principles coincides with statistical techniques. The former
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technique is focused on building a model that improves its performance based on previous
results [14], [120].
2.5.3 Machine Learning
For a better understanding of the anomaly detection approaches that apply ML techniques,
it is important introduce the concept of ML and its application in irregularity disclosure
process. ML is commonly associated with the futurists robots, although, it’s a real and
tangible concept. In fact, ML has been around for decades, nearby the 90s, with the Optical
Character Recognition (ORC) and the spam filters over the world. It has now embraced
several human domains such as the product recommendation and voice search. It is present
on financial field (e.g, fraud detection and stock market predictions) or in the smart cities area
through IoT traffic analysis and smart cars building. Also, in healthcare [124], revolutionizing,
for example, radiology by improving detection for more precise diagnostics [125]. It’s visible
the fast escalate ability, that tends to continue, as well as, the improvement on the human life
at various levels. But, will this growth only be accompanied by advantages?
According to Arthur Samuel, 1959, ML means:
"[ML is the] field of study that gives computers the ability to learn without being
explicitly programmed." [126]
A more complex and specific definition:
"A computer program is said to learn from experience E with respect to some task
T and some performance measure P, if its performance on T, as measured by P,
improves with experience E." [127]
However, ML many times is confused with Artificial Intelligence (AI). This two acronyms
used interchangeably, in fact, have a relation. ML is a subset of AI, whereas AI is the broader
concept of machines. It carry out tasks in a way that we would consider “smart”, while ML,
combines algorithms and methods to machines assimilated the data and learn by themselves
to reach that intelligence [128].
Spam-filter is one the most usual scenario to help understand the ML concepts. This
filter learns to flag spam, given examples of spam emails flagged by users and examples of
regular emails, i.e, nonspam 7. But, considers that the spam filter is built using traditional
programming techniques. To complete the program the coming steps must be followed [126]:
1. Analyze and observe the problem, recognize repeatedly words or phrases (such as “4U,”
“credit card,” “free,” and “amazing”) or other patterns.
2. Write a detection algorithm that covers the noticed patterns and flag emails as spam if
this patterns are detected.
3. Test the program and adjust the algorithm until it produces good results.
7also called ham emails
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It’s evident that with a programming approach, as the list of rules increase and became
more complex, scalability and maintenance turns into a problem. Moreover, if spammers detect
that their intentions are not being concluded, they start digging deeper in the problem and
discover, for instance, that emails containing “4U” are blocked. To overcome this drawback,
they might start writing “For U” instead. Using traditional programming, spam filter needs
to update the flag’s dictionary every time that spammers write and finds new words, only
being able to detect spam when spammers stop working to bypass them (thing that will never
happen), entering in an interminable cycle.
Study the 
problem
Train ML
algorithm
Analyze
errors
Launch!
Evaluate
solution
Data
Figure 2.10: Machine-Learning semi-automatic approach [126].
In contrast, a spam filter based on ML techniques (as show on figure 2.10), using the
training set to learn, automatically identifies which new words and sequences (that set the
patterns) are a good predictors to flag email as spam or nonspam. Once this approach reaches
progressive adaption, the program becomes less complex and easier to maintain, and possibly
more accurate [126]. Also, with ML capability, the system automatically observes the emerge
of uncommon words and starts to flag them without any intervention.
Data
Update
data
Train ML
algorithm
Launch!
Evaluate
solution
Can be automated
Figure 2.11: Machine-Learning schema that adapts automatically to changes [126].
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The Figure 2.11, shows the automated aptitude how a training set is retained, creating
almost a full automatic system, by only requiring monitoring. For problems with a reachable
solution requiring long lists of rules and subject to many data changes (how is the spam filter
case using a traditional approach), ML can improve the system’s efficiency and control. Even
for problems where there is no straightforward solution or no know algorithm, ML techniques
provide tools to humans digging and highlight useful information from massive datasets, by
studying what the algorithm has learned deducing patterns, which initially was not susceptible
to the human eye - data mining (as already referenced in 2.5)
Due to the broad scope presented by ML it is convenient for identification to classify
the numerous underlying system’s types into categories, that will be detailed over the next
sections, based on [126]:
• Influence of human supervision during training (supervised, unsupervised, semisuper-
vised, and reinforcement Learning)
• Possibility to learn incrementally from a stream of incoming data (online vs batch
learning)
• The ability to identify exclusive samples that never was seen before (instance vs model
based learning)
2.5.3.1 Supervised and Unsupervised Learning
ML algorithms in the training phase may have some type of human supervision. In a training
set, when each training instance (or sample) is appended to a label supplied by human, systems
are classified as supervised learning. A typical supervised assignment is classification. Bringing
the demonstrative example of spam filter again, in the training set, the algorithm learns
how to classify new emails "inspecting" the class of each email sample that belongs, spam or
ham [126].
Another primary application of supervised learning is regression. This task predicts a
target numeric value, for instance, the price of a car, by giving a set of features (mileage, age,
brand, and so on), called predictors. However, in this case, to a properly and faster learning,
the supervised learning system needs a dataset containing the predictors and their labels
(prices) [126]. Despite this, some regression algorithms do not have an exclusive proposal,
while can be used for classification using the output value that indicates the probability of
belonging to a class (e.g., 20% chance of being spam) [126].
The list of the most common supervised learning algorithms include [126]:
• k-Nearest Neighbors
• Linear Regression
• Logistic Regression
• Support Vector Machine
• Decision Trees and Random Forests
• Neural networks 8
8Note that some neural network’s architectures can be unsupervised as supervised
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Distinctively, in unsupervised learning, the training set is unlabeled, in which the system
tries to identify similarities between the inputs without any supervision [129]. Clustering
is a familiar application of unsupervised learning used over different areas like engineering,
bioinformatics, and medicine, where similar samples are gathered together, forming a cluster.
For example, given a dataset with a patient’s medical records and applying a clustering
algorithm over the data, it will detect groups of similar patients. The final results could reveal
subjects with related symptoms, and therefore, help the doctors diagnose. Also, unsupervised
learning techniques can be useful for detecting data irregularities, the outliers, employing
anomaly detection tasks [126]. In the previous healthcare example, this unsupervised algorithms
could be a support for monitoring and alerting deviations on patient’s condition [130].
Most problems deal with large sets of data containing a lot of complex and unlabeled
data. Dimensionality reduction, in which the goal is to simplify the data, representing them
with a smaller set of more “condensed” variables, can reduce computational load in further
processing, also as, establishing a method to describe the unstructured data (i.e, visualization)
helping to understand how it is organized and to identify unsuspected patterns [126], [131].
In the point between these two extremes is the semisupervised learning. In this type, the
training set combines both unlabeled and labeled data. Image recognition functions presented
in photo-sharing and cloud-service Google Photo’s are an excellent example of this algorithms.
First of all, the same person is identified over the uploaded photos grouping into clusters
(unsupervised part), but then to distinguish those people, the system needs to be supervised
by attributing labels for each founded person [126].
As a far cry from all these approaches is Reinforcement Learning, in this case, the learning
system works as an agent, that observes the environment and according with the selected
policy, acts. Conforming with the agent’s actions, rewards or penalties are given. Thus,
the system by itself learns which are the best actions (considering the given rewards and
penalties) and update the policy until found the optimal one [126]. AlphaGo Zero, the Google’s
DeepMind supercomputer, beat the world champion at the game Go. It was programmed
with millions of moves of past masters using reinforcement learning algorithms, in which the
winning policy was learned and tested by playing many games against itself, and used in the
ultimate final [126], [132].
2.5.3.2 Batch and Online Learning
Another criteria used to classify ML systems is the capability to or not learn incrementally
from a stream of incoming data. Batch learning is incapable of learning incrementally. In the
training phase the system uses all data at once, and when new inputs arrive, the training set
needs to be updated with the fresh data. Due to the system’s limitations into adapting, a
new system version must be done from scratch every new instance, being time and computing
consuming because it is done oﬄine.
To solve this impracticable solution in production environments, where a considerable
need of computer and storage resources are needed, online learning comes up, slowing down
the learning process and enabling the learning incrementally capacity. In this case, the system
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at a training stage, instead of collecting all data at once, the training set allows the provision
of new instances, individually or by small bunches, called mini-batches. Comparing with batch
learning, it supports and easily adapts to fast-paced environments where data is continually
changing, improving the time learning and not being necessary to rebuild the system for each
modification. Furthermore, the segmentation of the incoming data can be discarded once the
system has learned new data, reducing drastically the computing resources used.
However, it is mandatory to take into account the learning rate. This parameter controls
the system’s adaptability to data change, calibrating its reaction facing the late data. When
the system has a high learning rate it quickly adapts to change, but also quickly forgets
old learned data. That is what happens in a spam filter when built with high learning
rate, identifying only the new spam models. On the other hand, setting a low learning rate,
the system will learn more slowly, at the same time that will present inertia, i.e., will be
more tolerant to noise in data, not detecting possible errors. It is notorious the influence of
corrupted data on the system’s performance. Imagine a malfunctioning sensor on a robot.
The faulty data may sabotage the normal output results, translating into the loss of time
and resources (both monetary and computational). So, online learning monitors solutions
by tracking every change and scans the training set before being applied to algorithms. This
strategy overcomes the anomaly data storage and the system’s accuracy and efficacy. [126]
2.5.3.3 Instance-Based Versus Model-Based Learning
The already described types of ML tasks have one common goal: making predictions for new
values. Although, the system performance depends on how it generalizes, that is, the ability
to identify exclusive examples that never was seen before. Thus, there are two generalization
forms: instance-based learning and model-based learning. In the instance-based learning, the
system learns trivially, learns by heart [126]. For instance, the spam filter could be built
based on a simple approach, flagging only the emails that have already been flagged. However,
as this is not fully effective, instance-based learning uses a measure of similarity (e.g., word
count, etc.) to flag emails that are analogous to known spam. In opposition, model-based
learning handles the examples of the training set to generate a model which is used later to
make predictions by regression. Moreover, to the judge model’s quality, there are performance
measures like the fitness and cost functions. They are effective to evaluate how close the
predicted solution by the model is to the known values (“ground truth”) [126].
2.5.3.4 Main Challenges of Machine Learning
To benefit from the ML potential, the first thing to focus on is data. A good dataset might
convey in a good prediction model. But not always. The algorithm choice is also a critical
step to a good model. However, when they are put in practice into the wrong way, may put
at risk the problem resolution.
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Insufficient Quality of Training Data Michele Banko and Eric Brill in the acclaimed
paper [133] inspect the effects of data size on ML for natural language disambiguation problem
9. The final results demonstrated that different ML algorithms, against a complex problem,
performed almost identically, well once they were given enough data [126]. But now comes up
the following question: how much is the "enough" data? There is no generic rule. The corpus
size depends on the problem’s complexity. However, the amount of data is critical for good
learning, since even for a straightforward problem typically thousands of examples are needed,
and as stated in [133], the effort direction should be to change the development of the corpus.
The same idea was defended by Peter Norvig et al. in [134] showing the importance of having
a good dataset facing the algorithm development.
Non-representative Training Data Big Data trend [135], implies huge datasets.
Typically goes side by side with ML, but to ML successfully accomplish its duty, that is,
to predict various outcomes for new data, it must generalize appropriately. Having a vast
corpus does not mean that the data is representative of new cases to generalize. This trade-off
usually is hard to happen, as demonstrated by the famous example of sampling bias (i.e.,
the samples can be non-representative if the sampling method is distorted) during the US
presidential election in 1936, that has opposed Landon against Roosevelt. In a short version,
the Literary Digest conducted an extensive poll, sending mail to about ten million people,
and predicted that Landon would beat Roosevelt 57% to 43%. As it turned out, Roosevelt
won 62% to 37% [136]. The problem was on the sampling method. Despite a large amount of
collected votes, the poll of Literary Digest magazine surveyed its readers, and the readership
was skewed in a subgroup that supported Landon, in which a non-representativeness model
was created incapable to making a proper prediction [126].
Poor-Quality Data Nevertheless, an extensive volume of training data is not syn-
onymous of quality. If the training set is incorporated with flawed and imprecise examples
bringing up noise and outliers occurrences, the most likely outcome is the system’s inability
to detect underlying patterns, having a weak performance. The training corpus demands
a in-depth examination, discarding the evident outliers, or when there are instances with
missing features (e.g., lack of age or weight values), they can be discarded, ignored or filled
with other values (e.g., with the median age) to create a clean and solid training set [126].
Irrelevant Features A ML system only is capable of learning if the training data
contains more relevant than irrelevant features. As Aurélien Géron wrote in [126], "garbage
in, garbage out", emphasizing the importance of having a good set of features for ML. This
process called feature engineering is expressed on the successive points [126]:
• Feature selection: Election of the most significant features.
• Feature extraction: Create relevant features using the selected ones.
• Discover new features by, continuously, gathering and processing new data.
9For example, distinguish whether to write "to", "two" or "two"
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Overfitting and Underfitting the training data A common problem in ML is when
a model performs well on the training data but generalizes poorly to any new data, most of
times related to complex problems. This is known as overfitting. The opposite, is underfiting,
that occurs when the model is very simple and performing incorrectly on the training data [137].
The selection of additional parameters and other suitable features (feature engineering) or
reduction of the regularization of data [126], are the best suitable tools to overcome these
drawbacks.
2.5.3.5 Testing and Validating
To know how well the ML model generalizes we have to test with new cases and not merely
with the training set. Hence, to support this concept, normally data is split into two sets: the
training set and test set. Training the model with the training set and testing with the test set
helps to evaluate the model generalization behavior using the generalization error obtained
by evaluating the model on the test set when confronted with new cases. So, generalization
error reveals how the model performs on instances that it has never seen before, although,
validating different models to the same testing set falls into overfitting. That is, always dealing
with the same data can adapt the model to that training set, taking them to not perform so
well on new data.
To avoid this problem, the training set is split into smaller sets, where each model is
trained with a different set of combination and tested against the reaming ones - the validation
test. his technique that allows reusing of the training set is known as cross-validation. So, after
cross-validation is completed, the final model is trained and ready to compute the generalized
error measured on the test set [126].
Additionally, No Free Lunch theorem [138] is a typical example used for the validation
case. Assuming that each model is a simplified version of observations, i.e., when does not
exist any assumption of the data, there’s no reason to prefer a model over any other. For
instance, it may be a linear regression or a neural network, that there is no guarantee à priori
that any model is preferred over another, being the only way to know which one performs
better and if which one works for each case is to test them all [126].
2.6 Existing tools and solutions
Along of this work has been described some security mechanisms implemented by corporations
at the network level, being powerless to cover and stop all attack attempts. So, network
anomaly detection techniques are critical to safeguarding the internal peers, as well the classified
and private data for being disclosure. Among the several existed methods to detect atypical
network behaviors, for example, the interpretation of security logs and honeypots, this state
of the art will focus on low-level network traffic analysis mechanisms. Moreover, the described
network traffic anomalies solutions will be divide into non-commercial (corresponding to
implementations carried by conferences papers and articles) and commercial systems, directing
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the research scope to the two anomalies actions endorsed by this dissertation, propagation
attacks, and data exfiltration invasions.
2.6.1 Non-commercial
2.6.1.1 Spreading threats
Dainotti et al. in [139], study the network behavior of worms analyzing statistical properties
of traffic generated by these spreading irruptions. More precisely, was studied the Witty and
Slammer worms campaigns, computing packet-level variables, such inter-packet times and
packet sizes, from each session and over all aggregated traffic. In this experience the capture
traffic was filtered, dealing only with UDP packets, with source port 4000 for the Witty case,
and port 1413 for the Slammer worm case. Also, DNS traffic (related to legitimate data)
was permeated allowing to compare the mismatched proprieties between them. Important to
note that all the traffic traces contain only packet headers until layer 4, that is, no payload
information is retrieved. To analyze and extract the information from packets was used
the open-source software Plab [140]10, capable to separate into traffic sessions. So, for each
session the inter-packet time and packet size was calculated. Moreover, same information
was computed at the traffic as a whole. After collected this metrics, statistical methods were
applied over them, to visualize and characterize worm influence:
• Marginal distributions of inter-packet time and packet size for each host-based session
was studied using the Probability Density Function (PDF) and Cumulative Distribution
Function (CDF) [141].
• Packet size and inter-packet time autocorrelation of a infected host and DNS server.
• Wavelet analysis [142] over the aggregate traffic.
The applied statistical measures in this work were succeeded regarding behavior and
action mode detection of a worm, revealing peculiar distributions, lack of temporal correlation
comparing with normal traffic. Thus, this study is a useful approach to give insights into the
worm’s impact on network traffic. However, a posterior classification process is needed to
generalize for unseeing spreading campaigns.
In the same way, Wagner et al. in [143] aimed to detect spreading behaviors by network
traffic inspecting. It was developed an entropy based analysis method that highlights outbreaks
of fast worms in near real-time, that from the author’s perspective, can be empowered to
catch other network anomaly actions. So, from the observed network, packet information on
flow-level was extracted, that is, the IP source/destination address and the source/destination
ports belonging to a flow (TCP connection or UDP data stream). Wagner et al. [143], used
the measure of entropy to disclose regularities in connection-based traffic. Entropy [144] is a
basic concept of information theory which measures the uncertainty of a collection of data
items: more random it is, the more entropy it contains. In this way, entropy can be related to
worm behavioral because when a fast scanning worm propagates, the infected host tries to find
10Software belonging to the authors of this work
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other hosts to contaminate adopting a random style. Entropy is also related to lossless data
compression: the theoretical limit of the compression rate of a bit sequence is precisely the
entropy of the sequence [145]. Using this assumption, the sequences of network measurements
are compressed, where the resulting compressed size serves as the entropy estimation. In
this experience, Netflow v5 was employed to collect network data and extract measurements,
being realized two real-world proof-of-concept examples using the Blaster and Witty worms.
In addition, a sliding window strategy 11 was used to reduce the system latency and achieved
real-time analyzes. Therefore, results reveal, in the case of a scanning host, the overall entropy
in a specific time window is subdued to a change. More precisely, the presence of many flows
with the same source IPs (the scanning host) will lead to an abrupt decrease of the entropy in
the distribution of the source IP addresses. At the same time, the scanning host will attempt
to contact many different destination IPs on (possibly) different ports, generating an increase
in these entropy measurements.
In [146], Taha et al. also based on entropy metric to build a real-time system that
analyzes network traffic and detects anomalies. Similarly to the experience performed in [143],
from traffic flows were extracted the pairs source/destinations IP address and ports number,
however, the authors, also considered the number of bytes sent and receive as a feature. So,
packets were captured during a period of time, where the entropy was calculated in each time
interval. In this experience, in order to differentiate between normal and abnormal network
traffic behavior was introduced an adaptive threshold, defined by the degree distribution
and mean of the entropy values. In this way, when the entropy value of network traffic flow
exceeds the threshold, then it constitutes an anomaly. Besides, Yao et al. [147] employed
a combination of information theoretic entropy measure and Random Forest classification
to detect anomalies in network traffic. They used only four features from the packet header
(source IP, destination IP, source port and destination port) collected during a specific time
window. This exercise concerning the research works performed in [143], [146], can be seen as
a solution more adaptable to new types of anomalies since it empowers ML techniques.
Entering on ML field, new approaches are rising to make the anomaly traffic detention more
accurate. Sarnsuwan et al. [148] proposed an implementation to detect propagation incursions
by processing the network packets data and extracting features from abnormal/normal traffic
data, using three different supervised ML algorithms for data classification: Bayesian Network,
Decision Tree and Random Forest. In this method, Blaster worms are considered and inserted
into a LAN along with DoS attacks and other port scan attacks. Contrarily, the normal data
were obtained from web browsing, instant message, etc. Some features were extracted from raw
data such as the IP address, port, protocol and some flags of the packet header. Sarnsuwan
et al. [148] also applied a feature selection method based on the information gain technique
to select the more representative features. This framework works successfully, but cannot to
produce a perfect worm detection as some amount of actual data is not classified [149].
Limthong et al. [150] analyzed which interval-based features of network traffic were feasible
enough to detect anomalies and the more accurate ML techniques for the disclosure process.
11The same approach was adopted in this dissertation as will be described in 3.2
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The authors select several features (e.g., number of packets, sum of packet size, number
of flows, number of source address, and so on) computed during a defined interval, and
found which of them were more appropriate to detect back, sumrf, ipsweep, neptune and
portsweep attacks, through the use naive Bayes and k- nearest neighbor algorithms for the
traffic classification. Although, this work cannot perform real-time anomaly since it only
studies the best features for each outbreak. Moreover, Limthong one year later in [151],
continued the previous implementation, proposing a novel framework based on a combination
of time series and feature spaces, able to perform real-time detection over a real network
environment.
2.6.1.2 Data leakage
Data leakage, or data exfiltration, is particularly hard to detect because it uses a variety of
techniques to make the exposure more imperceptible. Even so, it is essential to research new
approaches to overcome and attenuate the damage caused by these outbound incursions.
Al-Bataineh et al. [152] proposed a novel technique to analyze and detect the malicious
data exfiltration in web traffic. It inspected the spiteful data stealing behaviors of one of the
most well-known data stealing botnets, Zeus. By studying its network activity, the authors
proposed a classifier to identify HTTP request that transports stolen data. So, the goal is
to monitor HTTP requests and identify malicious demands, employing the entropy and byte
frequency distribution of content files as features. In this work, encryption is seen as an
opportunity for detection rather than a limitation because if encryption is detected where
it is not expected, it should be considered an anomaly. In this way, Shanon’s Entropy [144]
was used to check the presence of encrypted contents in POST requests through the byte
entropy computation, once encrypted contents looks random in the ideal case, established a
threshold-based classifier: if the content entropy were equal or greater than the threshold,
then the content would be classified as encrypted, otherwise its considered non-encrypted. To
reduce false positives and negatives carried by the byte entropy feature, the byte frequency
distribution was introduced as a feature. It is a concept already proposed not only in file
type detection problems but also in malware detection inside packet payloads [153]. However,
in [152] the ambition was to differentiate encrypted contents from all other types given that it
has the most uniform distribution. To handle with this feature, from network web request
and responses, TCP flows and application layer data were assembled, parsing HTTP traffic
to extract headers and contents of each request and response. So, entropy and byte frequency
distribution were the final features, that fed the three different algorithms: NaiveBayes, Multi
Layer Perceptron (MLP) and J48 decision tree algorithms 12; being the last one the most
accurate, revealing good results on real scenarios.
Furthermore, Liu et al. [155] developed SIDD 13, a three-stage framework for detecting
insider attacks and sensitive data exfiltration. This system corresponds to a network bridge
12Weka software [154] was used to apply the three algorithms
13Sensitive Information Dissemination Detection
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located at the edge of the protected network which scans the outbound traffic, being composed
by three main levels:
• Application identification
This is the first stage, where the system determines which applications, based on
characteristics of its flow (at network level), are being used. To classify the applications
was used frequency domain and wavelets [156] analysis over the network traffic attributes,
such as the packet inter-arrival time and packet size. Application identification can
provide some useful information which allows proper policing of application traffic to
dictate what traffic is allowed across the network boundary.
• Signature and content detection
After completed the previous phase , DPI techniques were empowered to analyze
the network data content. The idea was to create network traffic signatures from its
content allowing to compare signatures and detect data exfiltration, based on packet
volume feature. Afterward, the retrieved content information is treated as a time series
which allows to use signal processing techniques and tools to analyze these signals.
• Covert communication detection
The last level was responsible to detect covert channels, where attackers mask the
protected information using legitimate channels, for instance, steganography scenario.
Although SIDD [155] applied statistical and signal processing techniques on traffic flows,
the major drawback of this system is the high packet processing capacity required in each
level, requesting a tremendous processing power to monitor and analyze each outgoing packet
at runtime. Also, the system dependency on the content signature matching, making it
susceptible to be outbreak by dissimilar types of data.
Ramachandran et al. [157] developed an implementation for data exfiltration detection
over the network by building a behavior based model. This experience does not rely solely
on network traffic analyzes but also the overall system features like the total memory and
total CPU consumption level. Since these last features do not part of the low-level traffic
analysis focus, the study of the work performed in [157] will only consider the network aspects.
Following these lines were employed the number of outgoing packets, outgoing bytes, incoming
packets, incoming bytes, control and data packets as network features, collected using SNMP.
So, initially, the system learned the normal behavior of a network by using kernel density
estimation (KDE) methods [158] over the described data network metrics. Afterward, in
the testing phase (that is, in the detection chapter) once again the kernel density estimation
is computed for the real-time traffic. Further, the current KDE values are compared with
the learned ones by check how much they are correlated: when KDE values were weakly
correlated, it is probable that anomalous actions happened.
Similarly, Sharma et al. [159] described a framework to detect potential exfiltration events
by monitoring a set of system and network level features (i.e., from hardware to the application
layer). Several distributed sensors composed it, each one responsible for a specific monitoring
task (e.g., hardware, process memory, system calls, network, etc) that continuously compares
live data with the normal-behavior profile. Once again the work analysis will focus at network
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level. To model the outbound network flow characteristics, the mean-inter departure packet
times (the rate of packets flying out) and the number of packets in a single TCP session
(quantity of outbound data) were chosen by the authors as network features. So, after the
egress traffic has been sniffed, over the aggregated data was computed average value of the
inter packet departure time per TCP session and the average number of packets sent in a
single TCP session, along with a whitelist carrying all the IP addresses with which the host
communicated. Moreover, the framework performance was compared against six commercial
security software, that in general, have better results for detection of the attack vectors
simulated in this experience. Although this implementation presented high discover capability
against the commercial solutions, some extra work, such as more exfiltration dynamics, where
leakage attacks deal with different size of files, may increase the framework performance, since
among the 1154 monitored TCP sessions, only three sessions involved the attacker exfiltrating
small files (<1 Mb) from the victim’s machine.
2.6.2 Commercial
Open source IDS are increasingly being used due to the free availability and simple usage.
The most widely utilized are: Snort [160], Bro [161] and Suricata [162]. All of them were
designed for intrusion detection, yet, Bro mostly could be considerate as a traffic analysis
language [110]. Their detection engine, where is detected any intrusion activity exiting in
packets, is signature-based (2.1.6). This means that each packet is opposed and compared
against a set of predefined rules, that is, hand-crafted signatures of recognized attacks. The
major drawbacks of this open source solutions are:
• Inaccurate detection
First of all with a signature-based classification these monitoring devices cannot
detect zero-days exploits (2.1.6). Moreover, it is necessary a system with high exposure
and low false-alarm rates.
• Poor scalability and time delay action
Especially when there is increasingly more traffic, the exponential growth of data is
causing tool overload. Taking each packet and verifying if some of the rules matches,
could degrade the performance of the system along with the increase of resources to
perform the task.
It is noticeable that most of today’s IDS failed. As follows, recently Cisco launched a new
software, named Cisco Stealthwatch Enterprise. It provides continuous real-time monitoring,
capable to detect suspicious behaviors such as:
• zero-day malware
• DDoS attacks
• lateral movement outbreaks
• insider threats
• data exfiltration charges
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This implementation uses cognitive analytics, i.e., a cloud base analysis engine that
assembles a baseline profile to automatically detecting anomalous traffic. Cognitive analytics
is an exclusive factor since the processing core is moved to the cloud, where ML and statistical
modeling techniques are applied for intraflow metadata and encrypted traffic analysis. In
this way, the system can learn without human support, from what it sees and adapted to
changes [163].
Darktrace’s company developed a competitor software, the Enterprise Immune System,
that combines real-time threat detection employing ML algorithms. It determines the normal
of each user and subnet in the network, and with a self-learning process, it can detect traffic
deviations. Lately, was released the Darktrace Antigena for a faster and precise response
when facing emerging threats [164]. It succeeded spited a real threat executed by a resentful
employee that reacted to their company strategy to deal with Brexit, by digging out and
leaking confidential documents. So, Darktrace’s Antigena detected and stopped this insider
data exfiltration action [165], expressing its potential and the anomaly detection aptitude in
true corporate network scenarios. In fact, this two software endorse a ML learning system
capable of detected the to main goals oh this work, malicious propagation inside a network
and the data exfiltration scene.
2.7 Conclusion
To conclude, the examination conducted in this chapter revealed that in the face of existing
flaws in modern corporate networks, not being able to fully ensure the integrity and confiden-
tiality of data and services, the usage of ML associated to anomaly detection to complement
those points of failure, meets the current trends presented in Section 2.6. However, the
high variability and unpredictability of network traffic can influence the decision of the ML
system due to the high variance introduced. Along these lines, being the path to follow
in the anomalous domain, human intervention and supervision is a less required factor in
autonomous decision, but for now not yet totally independent.
40
CHAPTER 3
Methodology for detecting
anomalous communications on a
corporate network
In this chapter is discussed the possible methodologies used to infer network patterns and
expose anomalous behaviors inside a corporate network. It is a generic procedure, which
covers not just one particular case, acting as a guide, where the collected raw network data is
transformed into relevant information capable of distinguish between normal and abnormal
observations. The first section explains how data is gathered, following by the description of
the used knowledge extraction method. This chapter is also a pipeline to recognize network
patterns, from the data visualization and interpretation, to the ML algorithms application.
3.1 Network data acquisition
Monitoring probes location is the first concern for corporations being able to infer network
behaviors. As discussed in Section 2.4, among the several monitoring tools and strategies,
aiming to detect anomalies that exceed the normal traffic patterns (e.g., lateral movement
and data exfiltration incursions), at an enterprise level, a distributed port mirror solution
applied in all access layer switches provides a detailed and precise acquiring traffic data. If it
was placed at distribution and/or core layer switch level, network data generated by attached
end-hosts on the access layer will not show up. On the other hand, gathering network data at
host-level, from each existing machine and equipment, sounds like an impractical strategy
facing the increased complexity in the analysis and storage of the collected traffic.
Thus, operating at layer 2 level of OSI model, it is possible to mirror internal VLAN
traffic that passes through an interface, performed by the associated endpoints, pointing an
unusual contact between direct machines, which may be indicative of internally spreading
malware. Besides, handling with granular information (low-level traffic) allows learning
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the organization’s normal outbound communications preventing information out-of-company
information migration. However, to clarify, the place and type of monitoring strategy varies
according to the problem in question (as discussed in Section 2.4).
Sniffers can perform traffic analysis functions, withal, it is the intent of this dissertation,
that probes only capture data without any processing ability. In this way, at a sniffer-level,
is generated a considerable volume of data containing nonessential information that can be
discarded, simplifying the analysis and storage process. To build a behavior analysis-based
systems it is necessary to dissect packets in order to extract symbolic data that express network
activity. The confines of packet inspection are defined by the fourth OSI level, reading and
collecting mostly values of OSI layer 3 and 4 (Network and Transport respectively), relying
on TCP and UDP protocols for obtaining the fowling packet information:
• Size of the packet
• IP origin and destination
• UNIX epoch time of the packet
• Ports origin and destination
• TCP flags (only for the TCP packets)
3.2 Feature engineering
3.2.1 Converting packets into samples
The wired data collected from the probe needs to be analyzed, since, only represents network
packet metadata. It must be translated into network traffic observations to create a model
that describes a pattern or behavior. Some models could be defined by few rules that can be
done pragmatically by looking into the dataset and delineate activity thresholds. Still, when
dealing with extensive and complex datasets the analysis becomes much arduous, being ML
ideal to discover hidden patterns and unrecognized relations. The ML model performance
depends on the representative examples provided to it. That means, to the model predict
more correctly the normal and the anomalous patterns, needs to be fed with examples that
illustrate activity observations. In this way, determining what ML algorithms input are is
known as feature engineering. This is the process of transforming raw data into features that
represent the underlying problem, many times dependent on the analyst’s experience and of
the dataset understanding.
Shaping the network relations and behaviors from the extracted packets information, by
creating the features could be done using several approaches. However, packet data can be
associated over time, revealing periodic actions and quantify activity events. Both human
and machine acts occur at a different frequency, rate, and scale, but, may present recurrent
actions over time, translating into periods of similar activity. For instance, a human user
performs more actions during the day than at night, characterized by small and sudden traffic
peaks corresponding to the clicks. On the other hand, a company file server may present a
more disperse traffic rate of activity during the day, producing higher action scales with more
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frequency than human behavior. Nevertheless, network events do not strictly exhibit periodic
behavior and can vary over time. So, this variation also should be taking into consideration
to create more reliable features.
In light of these time-dependent examples, packets could be modeled in relation to time
tracing an activity pattern and revealing underlying services. The main idea is illustrated in
Figure 3.1, where the total time of activity (i.e., the capture time between the first and last
packet collected by the sniffer), is divided into ∆t small intervals.
Samples
Figure 3.1: Splitting of the total activity in smaller sampling windows. Each slice aggregates the
sum of packets metadata during the ∆t time.
Each slice contains counting metrics of data over ∆t period, that will be used to form the
features which traduce network observations. So, the capture time is divided into sampling
windows (corresponding to a ∆t slice), each one encompassing the sum of the packet events
occurred during that interval. These metrics will model an activity pattern using some
"individual" time-dependent attributes such as:
• Statistical packets counts
Counting of packets along with their attributes like the number of contacted IP
addresses can define a normal or intrusion behavior.
• Network protocols routine
Packet sum by protocol and their utilization, for instance, number of UDP/TCP
ports, could reveal a pattern of services used and its position in the network
However, packets can be aggregated into traffic objects that have the same IP source address
and one of the TCP port numbers equal, the data stream aggregations [166]. Empowering
this aggregation solution enables the control of all ingress and egress traffic, managing its
volume, duration and the open sessions with other peers. Thus, counting metrics can be
computed over these flows. Since an exposed port characterizes a service„ that means, uses
TCP or UDP at the transport layer, it is possible to manage the number of connections and
service usage by machine. Yet, the way of how TCP 1traffic is aggregated depends on the
situation. In the case of supervising the internal network state, a good approach is counting
the overall TCP sessions, more precisely, the opened sessions for all contacted destination
ports. This is useful to detect propagation attacks inside a corporate network. Differently,
if the goal is to control a particular service, then seems a good solution to count the active
sessions for the specific service port (for example, port 445 related to SMB service). Further,
concerning outbound traffic, it is necessary to take into account the firewall permissions. At
1Most of the Internet applications runs over TCP
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the corporate level, some external services are "blocked" in the firewall, so, in this case, only
the permitted ports should be included for the TCP sessions count.
Other counting attributes can be used. However, the choice depends on the environment
type, the problem and what is intended to be observed for modeling its behavior. For instance,
if the environment in question deals with heavy and abundant data, like the cinematographic
companies, where terabytes of data travel over the network, counting the amount of traffic
per interval could not give significant observations. Instead, identifying traffic flows and
services usage could be a good starting point to find patterns. On the other hand, enterprise
environments contain merely traffic associated with mail and browsing services, considering
the volume of traffic may be a way to detect unusual behaviors.
Other significant concern is the value of ∆t. Assuming short values in the splitting criteria,
less data is accumulated, and consequently, it is ideal for detecting high-frequency events,
such peers communications. Nevertheless, high ∆t values create small sampling windows with
more data, capable of detecting human events.
3.2.2 Generating network observations
The extraction of samples from packets is the first layer of computation, where the result is
merely the sum of counting metrics. In this way, it is necessary a next computation-level,
where these statistical metrics are transformed into significantly network observations, capable
of modeling an activity behavior and pointing unnoticed deviations. This is the last step
before the ML data pipeline is applied, and for this reason, the modeling process efficacy is
associated with the ML system performance: generating meaningful network observations will
facilitate the ML algorithm to produce representative results.
Therefore, in this stage, the sample windows created in the previous process are combined
through a sequential iterative process. At each iteration results in a new observation window,
being a high-level computation of the previous sampling windows. Assuming that the data
was captured during one week and each sampling window contains statistical data during two
minutes, Table 3.1 shows the result of a weekly strategy of data splitting.
Table 3.1: Relation between observation window’s length and number of observations. It was
considered one week activity with two minutes sampling windows.
Observation’s duration Formed windows Observations number
10 minutes 5 1008
15 minutes 7 672
30 minutes 15 336
1 hour 30 168
10 hours 300 16
24 hours 720 7
The way of iteratively is divided will influence the system response time and the number
of network observations produced. Assuming that no splits were made over the capture time
equal to one day, thus, ∆t will represent a day and only will be produced one observation.
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Moreover, the system only will be capable of comparing the observation, identified if it is a
normal or abnormal pattern, after a day ending, meaning that the response time is equal to
one day. On the other hand, if the total day of activity collected is highly split, the response
time will increase. Withal, observation windows will contain more non-representative data,
since the distinctive patterns will be dissolved among the several observations that provide
very similar data. Along with the response time concern, the number of observations generated
is also an important point, since some ML algorithms need more or fewer data according to
the problem. In this way, should be found a balance between the system’s response time and
the number of observations needed.
Furthermore, the described sequential iteration strategy, where windows are inflexible
blocks, cannot handle activity variations over time. For example, a company file server
configured to every day, at the same time, perform backups of a workday, and for some reason,
a system error occurs changing the period of backup. So, this activity is seen as an anomaly
when shifted to other windows. With all these issues, a sliding window strategy, as described
in Figure 3.2, it is preferable carrying the following benefits:
• Increase of the observations number
• Increase of the response time:
The period of decision is defined by the shifter value, which traduces the dislocation
time between windows. It can cover longer periods of observation maintaining a short
period of decision, allowing quicker responses.
• Equal portion of sampling windows covered:
By doing several shits over the same data, distinct observation windows are formed
mapping the same behavior, and the activity variations are no longer consider abnormal
action.
TIMEBAR
WINDOW 0
WINDOW 1
WINDOW 2
WINDOW 3
Figure 3.2: Representation of the sliding window implementation over the various sampling windows.
In each iteration a new sliding window overlaps a set of windows, generating network
observations.
Thus, as shown in Table 3.2 and comparing with the results obtained in Table 3.1, when
using a sliding window strategy an increase of the observations number is verified. However,
as in the previous procedure, the trade-off between the observation window duration and the
shift value should be taken into consideration, to find the right balance between them.
45
Table 3.2: Number of observations produced variating the observation window duration and the shift
value, when a sliding window strategy is empowered.
Observation’s duration Shift time Observations number
10 minutes 1 second 604201
15 minutes 10 seconds 60391
30 minutes 40 seconds 15076
1 hour 10 minutes 1003
10 hours 1 hour 159
24 hours 4 hours 37
Correspondingly, the system’s scope has a crucial impact on the sliding window’s decision
size. For instance, a smaller sliding window would not be able to fit HTTP browsing traffic
since it is characterized by short periods of high bandwidth utilization with non-periodic
durations. On the other hand, hourly periodic backups would be detected using a larger
sliding window.
3.2.3 Network modeling and feature conception
After the construction of the sliding windows, it is needed to convert the statistical samples
into features. In this way, inside of each sliding window feature computation is performed.
As shown in Figure 3.3, each column represents the individual counting attributes generated
during the sliding window interval. One strategy to extract the pretended network observations
is to apply time-independent statistics like the average, median, variance, etc; over each column.
Supplementary, another view for modeling the network activity is to count the number of
zeros for each attribute column. For instance, considering the packet’s count attribute, the
presence of zeros reveals the lack of activity in that period and, afterward, it is possible to
generate extra features like the silence period, along with their mean, average and so on.
Instead, the counting of zeros over all the sliding windows (i.e., from all columns) could exhibit
the window’s completeness and shape.
In this way, the next step is to provide these features to the ML pipeline in order to build
a profile based on pattern identification, used to classify and find unusual activities.
46
averagemedian variance kurtosis skewnessaveragemedian variance kurtosis skewness averagemedian variance kurtosis skewness
ip_internal internal_bytes_down tcp_sessions_445
...
Feature computation
Sliding window
time 
 
Figure 3.3: Illustration of how feature computation happens inside of a sliding window and produce
the final observation features.
3.2.4 Dataset interpretation
After the feature creation process is completed and representative activity observations are
established, the formed samples represent statistical values that will feed the ML algorithm.
Since it is a supervised learning problem, the dataset needs to be labeled for the ML system
to classify anomalous behaviors.
A high-level overview of the data is a good starting point to interpret the structure and
the composition of a dataset. Checking the number of instances per feature or label, along
with the mean, minimum, maximum, standard deviation and percentiles gives a view of the
dataset shape and completion. Standard deviation and percentiles measures show how to
disperse the values are from each other, and, in its turn, counting the number of instances
that can reveal if the dataset is or not balanced. Another way to have a perception of the
data is to plot a histogram that shows the number of instances (on the vertical axis) that have
a given value range (on the horizontal axis). When performed over a period of time, can point
out the silence and activity period, along with the samples scales and the data distribution.
This last point is important since when histograms extend much further to one of the sides
in relation to the median (tail heavy) can be more difficult to ML detect patterns. Figure
3.4 represents an example of a histogram showing the number of collected network packets
when Youtube’s videos were seen. It is notorious the activity burst between the 120 and 150
seconds, unlike the inactivity that marks the remaining time.
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Figure 3.4: Histogram obtained from counting packets when Youtube activity was realized.
Considering that features are collected and generated with the network model in mind,
there is no need to clean the data. A typical step is to fill the missing data and remove the
malformed ones (e.g., null values and presence of characters). In case of classifying network
anomalies, the samples resulted from the sliding windows computation, exhibit instances with
the value zero, being essential to model a pattern, once traduced the lack of activity during
that interval.
Before loading the data to the ML algorithm, it is also relevant to look for correlations
between attributes. Computing the standard correlation coefficient between every pair of
features can expose uncovered relations among data. Figure 3.5 exemplifies the correlation
matrix of three features. The main diagonal (from top left to bottom right) would be full of
straight lines (each feature directly correlates with itself). Thus it is plotted the representation
of a histogram of each diagonal feature [126].
Figure 3.5: Correlation matrix of some dataset features. Diagonals symbolize the feature histograms
where it is visible the tail heavy problem. Graphs show the linear relationship each pair
of features aiming to find correlations for each pair.
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From the linear correlation matrix shown in Figure 3.5, it is noticed that bytes upload
average and bytes upload median features are correlated due to the density shape caused
by the overlapped points. Besides, looking to the diagonal line of each feature, it is verified
the tail heavy distribution problem already mentioned. In this way, linear correlations allow
combining high correlated features, avoiding its redundancy.
However, searching for data correlations can be a complex task when datasets are too
large, being difficult to see all the paired relations. For instance, if the dataset has 15 features
the scatter matrix will form 152 plots, making it visualization impossible.
3.2.5 Features dimensionality
Having an extensive quantity of features does not make an estimator more effective. In fact,
the performance of a classifier decreases when the problems dimensionality increase (i.e., the
number of inputs rise), along with computational performance on the training phase. No
fixed directive tells how many features should be used in classification, being dependent on
the amount of training set available and the classifier type used. In this way, for a good
estimator performance, fewer features require a fewer number of samples, whereas, the number
of training instances needed grows exponentially with the number of dimensions used. This
is the Curse of dimensionality problem. In light of this, an infinite number of samples, in
practice, is impossible to obtain, once is important to understand the required quantity of
features concerning the amount of existing samples, always having in mind the classifier
performance.
Ideally, ML algorithms should be able to use whichever features are necessary, discarding
the irrelevant ones. However, to implement feature reduction as a preprocessing step could
reduce the space and computation complexity, allowing to understand better the problem
through data visualization. This can be achieved by employing two techniques: feature
selection and feature extraction. In feature selection, the objective is to find the optimal
number and combination of features, that means, the k most meaningful of the d dimensions
and discard the other (d − k) dimensions. Differentially, in feature extraction, the wanted
result is a new set of k dimensions that are combinations of the original d dimensions [167],
where the most employed method is the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) (detailed in
Section 3.3.1.2).
3.3 Knowledge extraction
After completing the features and associated samples elaboration, data is almost arranged to
be consumed by the ML algorithm, which is responsible for modeling the activity behaviors.
To highlight that, before the knowledge extraction is performed, depending on the supervised
ML algorithms, some extra and preprocessing steps are required. The recommended course
of phases is illustrated in Figure 3.6. It shows all the adopted pipeline until the final goal is
achieved: classify events as normal or anomaly; and the following sections will describe the
represented stages.
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Figure 3.6: Description of data pipeline stages. Data begins by being transformed to be suitable
for Machine-Learning algorithms. In the final phase is performed the Machine-Learning
algorithms evaluation.
3.3.1 Data preparation
3.3.1.1 Data splitting
The first step of stage 1 is the division of the full dataset into training and test set. It is
common to employ the Pareto principle where randomly is assigned 80% of the complete
dataset for training and, therefore, 20% for the test set. This empowers a purely random split
that typically does not introduce any issues when the dataset is large enough. Otherwise,
sampling bias could be introduced. Along these lines, it is necessary to guarantee that data is
divided into subgroups that are representative of the overall data. More precisely, the existing
data category proportions in the full dataset should be maintained on the newly created
subsets. This is known as stratified sampling and should always be taking into consideration
for the division strategy.
Moreover, the data division concern does not occurs only once. As described in Section
2.5.3, cross-validation is used to evaluates the model’s training accuracy, where the training set
once again is divided into a smaller training set and a validation set. It creates a N distinct
folds, training and evaluate the model N times, picking every time a different folder and train
on the N − 1 remaining folds. So, enhancing that even, in this case, the stratification should
be safeguarded, preserving right classes proportion concerning the train and validation sets.
3.3.1.2 Feature reduction
As described in Section 3.2.5, fed an ML algorithm with all the event descriptors (i.e., features)
without any previous analysis, will be translated into higher complexity and time consuming on
prediction tasks. Feature reduction is mandatory to simplify classification and group correlated
features. This adjustment may cause the loss of some information, although, it refines the
noisy and redundant variables. Furthermore, the visualization is more straightforward, by
breaking down into fewer features, enabling the discover relevant insights about activity
patterns.
PCA is widely used as a dimensionality reduction method, consisting into a linear projection
by firstly identifying the hyperplane that lies closest to the data, and then, projecting data onto
a lower-dimensionality hyperplane. The projection has the following criteria: maximize the
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variance and reduce the mean square distance between the original dataset and its projection.
Choosing the projection with higher variance diminish the loss of information. Figure 3.7
shows a example of PCA reduction.
Figure 3.7: Example of PCA reduction over a fabricated dataset [168]. It is demonstrated that the
inverse transformation validate that component reduction conserved all most information.
From left to right, the first image represents the original data deposition, the second image,
in its turn, describes the PCA reduction over the original data where the best unique features
that describe the sample are computed. The final image proves that no valuable information
is lost by inverting the reduction process.
Furthermore, choosing the number of dimensions to reduce the dimensionality problem
should not be arbitrary. Except for the visualization case, where generally two or three
dimensions are handled, it is desirable to embrace the number of dimensions that stands
for a sufficiently large portion of the variance (e.g., 95%). A simple procedure to verify and
certificate these ideal variance percentage is to plot the explained variance as a function of
the number of dimensions, as shown in Figure 3.8. Typically an elbow in the form of a curve
is formed, indicating the point where the explained variance stops growing fast, also, helps
to understand which number of dimensions has less loss of variance, and therefore, relevant
information [126].
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Figure 3.8: Example of an explained variance as a function of the number of dimensions [126]. It is
possible to see that reducing the number of dimensions to 130, there will not be much
loss of relevant information.
3.3.1.3 Feature scaling
The analysis obtained after the data overview, as elucidate in Section 3.2.4, can indicate the
presence of numerical attributes with different scales and distributions. This last step of Data
preparation’s stage it is an essential transformation to not degrade predictive performance of
ML algorithms. However, some algorithms are exceptions not requiring this preprocessing
stage, as will be descried further in Section 3.3.2.
There are two transformation types to ensure that all attributes have the same scale:
• Normalization
It shifts and bound the values to a specific range, [0, 1] or [−1, 1], by subtracting the
min value and dividing by the max minus the min [126].
• Standardization
In this case, there is no rescaling to a fixed range. The goal is to guarantee that
each value has a zero mean (i.e., removing the mean) and unit variance distribution,
subtracting each value by the mean and after, divided by the variance.
In ligth of this, Standardization, by not bounding values, could be a constraint to some
algorithms like Neural Network (NN) that expect input numerical values ranging from 0 to 1.
Moreover, it is much less affected by outliers. Considering a dataset with outliers, this values
expose a different scale dimension in relation to the remained ones. Thus, by shrinking the
range, outliers information will be lost, and their are crucial for modeling the activity pattern.
One other important concern, is that the employed scale should be the same both in the
training and test sets, avoiding numeric data discrepancies.
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3.3.2 Pattern modeling
In order to classify modeling network observations and predict an output, labeling the data
is a demand. The essential objective is to classify between normal and anomalous network
communications. This is the primary classification method, where only are two classes - binary
classification. Yet, at a corporate level, network activity is not so simple to analyze, being
a convoluted environment, where various malicious threats occur. In this way, aggregating
different attacks behaviors on a single group could increase the problem complexity and
reduce the capacity of distinguished anomalies dynamics and patterns, culminating into a
poor generalization.
Furthermore, assuming the incursions diversity, one other possible approach is to assign a
label to each attack vector, creating more than two different classes - multiclass classification.
Like so, the classifier can learn easily and differentiate the characteristic patterns of each
divergent communication. However, the predictive competence could be influenced by similar
network observations belonging to distinct classes. So, the ML algorithms are seen as a big
"black boxes" with N input classes outputting only a single label. This can be decomposed
into smaller sequential "black boxes" that handle with binary classification problems. Breaking
down the problem allows to have more control over the classifying course and endorse the
application of different counter measures for each network irruption. There are two techniques
for segregating a multiclass classification: One-versus-Alls and One-versus-One.
Assuming that is pretends to control three different attack vectors, for instance, a DoS
incursion, a ransomware propagation, and a data exfiltration attacks - it is a multiclass
problem formed by three classes. Using the One-versus-Alls strategy, three binary classifiers
are built, being each one responsible for one class. When, new instance arises, each classifier
provides a decision score for the specific instance, selecting the class whose binary classifier
outputs with the highest score (winner-takes-all strategy). Contrarily, in the second strategy,
each binary classifiers deals with a par of positive/negative class (i.e., between normal traffic
and DoS attacks, between normal traffic and data exfiltration, and so on). Moreover, if there
are N classes, N(N − 1)/2 binary classifiers are generated, showing a fast class growth. For
instance, in this situation with three classes will result in six binary "black boxes". At last,
each binary classifier assigns the instance to one of the two classes, and the most voted class
determines the instance classification.
3.3.2.1 Support Vector Machine
SVM is a classification algorithm, where the main idea is to find the boundaries between
known samples, defining a hyperplane. Like so, SVM is sensitive to feature scales, being
necessary that Data Preparation’s stage (Figure 3.6) including feature standardization 3.3.1.3.
According to the dataset, data could be easily separated, creating a straight line and
establishing a decision boundary with a maximum margin (corresponding to the Linear
SVM case). Figure 3.9 exemplifies the described separation, where the decision boundary is
supported by the instances placed on the edge, the support vectors.
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Figure 3.9: Exemplification of the SVM’s strategy for a two-class problem where the instances of the
classes are shown by squares and dots. The thick line is the optimal hyperplane and the
dashed lines define the margins on either side. The fill instances are the support vectors.
Finding a good balance between keeping the margins large as possible and limiting the
violations (i.e., instances that end in the middle of the boundary decision or on the wrong side
[126]) is a challenge for well performed classifications. This equilibrium is called soft margin
classification and it is controlled by the C parameter. Figure 3.10 represents C parameter
influence in the decision boundary shape.
Figure 3.10: Visualization of the impact of SVM’s C parameter in the separation margin and the
tolerance in relation to outliers created by such separation.
A large C value models a minor decision boundary, but with less violations, as the left
graphic of Figure 3.10 exposes, presenting a better generalization for outliers. Instead, smaller
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values for parameter C produce wide margins, as it is visible on the right side of Figure 3.10,
however with more violations.
Many datasets are not linearly separable, as the case of heterogeneous network data, and
in this circumstances, SVM is considered a Nonlinear classifier. In nonlinear problems, the
data is mapped to a new high dimensional space, where the formed linear model in the new
space corresponds to a nonlinear model in the original space. This is possible due to the
kernel tricky [167].
Training SVM, labeled data is needed and, originally, is a binary classifier. In this away,
to cover multi-class problems, SVM algorithm empowers One-versus-all and One-versus-One
strategies (explained in the above section). Likewise, SVM also could be extended as an
unsupervised learning algorithm which tries to separate all data without having labeled data,
the One-class SVM [169], being applied and implemented on outlier detection problems [167],
[170].
3.3.2.2 Decision Trees
DT is also a ML algorithm capable of performing classification, characterized by a hierarchical
structure and composed by the following main elements:
• Root node
• Decision node, which applies a test function to an attribute
• Branch, that represents an outcome of the test to an attribute
• Leaf node, representing the final object class label
 > 45x2
 > 10x1
Yes No
Yes No
Figure 3.11: Example of a DT structure. Oval nodes are the decision nodes and the rectangles are
leaf nodes.
Using Figure 3.11 to understand how DT works, it starts at the root node, where each
decision node applies a test function, tagging the outcome with a label in the branches. Along
the tree, tests are enforced doing recursive splits, until the leaf nodes are hit, giving the
final label. The quality of a split depends on the impurity measure. A split is considered
pure if after the division all the instances choose a branch composed of items of the same
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class. In other words, the split objective is to form homogeneous groups of the training
set. Thus, when a pure split is reached, divisions stopped and label can be assigned to the
leaf node. The function that calculates the impurity is defined as entropy, wherein each
step during tree growing is chosen the split that causes entropy values close to zero. In this
way, DT implements a divide-and-conquer strategy, broken complex functions into small and
more manageable problems. Due to its easy interpretation, DT is very popular, many times
preferable over more accurate methods [167], and highly used in anomaly activity detection
[171], [172].
3.3.2.3 Ensemble Classifiers
All the previous elucidated classification algorithms are working solely over the categorization
data problem, that means, the classification outcome is based on the most accurate result
provided by a single predictor. Ensemble method emerged to deal with complex tasks, building
different types of approaches to solving the same problem. In ML, the basic idea is to gather
a group of predictors (called an ensemble) to improve the accuracy over a single estimator.
Ensemble learning has two main techniques:
• Bagging:
Every predictor is trained with the same algorithm, but implementing a bootstrapping
technique. That means each predictor is trained with a different random subset of the
original training set with replacement, making possible the same instance appears in
different subsets (bagging). The classifiers are used in parallel, as described in Figure
3.12, allowing training instances to be sampled several times. When facing a new
instance, each predictor classifies it individually, being the final classification decision
based on the class with the majority of votes.
Training set
Random sampling
with replacement
Classiﬁers
Figure 3.12: Representation of the Bagging technique. Predictors are able to act in parallel due to
random sampling with replacement of the original training set.
• Boosting:
It combines a set of weak learns to create a final strong learner, where iteratively,
each new classifier is influenced by the previously built ones, trying to correct their
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misclassified predictions, as Figure 3.13 illustrates. Adversely to the bagging strategy,
where the predictors act in parallel, regarding to boosting, each predictor depends on
the previous one, not scaling as well as bagging, once it cannot be parallelized.
INTERATION 1 INTERATION 2 INTERATION 3
FINAL CLASSIFIER/
STRONG CLASSIFIER
Figure 3.13: Representation of the boosting technique empowered by ensemble methods, iterating
and self adjusting the decision edges, until the desired number of predictors is reached
or when a strong classifier is founded.
Random Forest is an ensemble of decision trees that uses bagging for training. Moreover,
there are two central boosting implementations, Adaboost and Gradient Boosting. Besides,
recently a new implementation Xgboost, became widely used in Kaggle competitions having
already won several prizes [173]. Adaboost algorithm applies boosting techniques and acts by
creating several weak learners, where the new predictor corrects its predecessor by increase and
update the relative weight of misclassified training instances, in order to give more emphasis to
the training instances misclassified and build a strong classifier. Gradient Boosting acts in the
same way, however, instead of adjusting the instance weights at every iteration, this method
fits the new predictor based on the residual errors made by the previous predictor [126].
Further, usually, ensemble algorithms use decision trees as base predictors making them
invariant to feature scaling, being scaling step skipped when dealing with one of this methods.
3.3.2.4 Neural Networks
When facing with network monitoring problems, systems usually deal with large-scale datasets.
SVM despite being an effective method of intrusion classification, is typically a quadratic
optimization problem [174], that will decrease its performance when handling extensive
datasets. Moreover, data generally comes in a streaming fashion, and SVM does not support
online learning.
So, NN techniques, the main concept of Deep Learning, have gained popularity and
successfully applied to fields like speech (e.g., Google’s Cloud Speech) and music/audio
signal recognition(e.g., Shazam). To solve the drawbacks described above, different NN
implementations have been tested in network pattern identification problems [175], [176],
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making a IDS more scalable and able to solve complex ML tasks. Perceptron 2 is the simplest
architecture of NN, composed by multiple inputs and one output with associated weights.
MLP combines multi-layers of perceptrons, characterized by input, output and hidden layers,
as represented in Figure 3.14. In this implementation, the network could have or not a bias
neuron and a backpropagation algorithm. After the network has an output value for each
neuron, it calculates the output error, checking the difference between the desired output and
the actual output. Then it reviews how each neuron in the previously hidden layers contributes
to the error until reaching the input layer. The main idea behind the backpropagation is to
slightly change the weights until having a result closer than expected. So, NN in training uses
Stochastic Gradient Descent to optimize the weights according to a specific solver [126].
In the same way that SVM, NN also is sensitive to feature scale, and therefore the pipeline
requires feature scaling (3.3.1.3), converting each attribute to the scale with a mean of zero.
Moreover, to accomplish better results, it is necessary tuning a number of hyperparameters
such as the number of hidden neurons and layers.
INPUT LAYER HIDDEN LAYER 1 HIDDEN LAYER 2 OUTPUT LAYER
Figure 3.14: Neural network schema composed by the input and output layers and two hidden layers.
In case of having two or more hidden layer, neural networks are designated as Deep
Neural Network.
3.3.2.5 Novelty and outlier detection
The performance of ML classification algorithms depends on the provided data quality, and
most of real world datasets do not contain meaningful examples of abnormal samples. In this
way, a good solution to contradict this lack of negative examples and performing anomaly
detection is outliers detection. The main idea is to separate the regular observations from
some polluting ones, the outliers. Outlier is an observation which deviates from the other
observations appearing to be incompatible. Likewise, novelty detection has the same goal, yet
outliers do not constitute the training data. For once, in novelty detection the outliers are
2Also called linear threshold unit (LTU)
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discovered in new observations, contrarily to outlier detection, that needs to fit the central
mode of the training data, ignoring the deviant observations. On both methods, the normality
distribution and borders are learned from the normal instances creating a base model for
that population. Thus, when a new instance arrives, if it lays outside the learned frontier it
is classified as an outlier sample. Otherwise, is seen as an inline observation similar to the
existing ones.
The novelty strategy is demonstrated in Figure 3.15, where is implemented the One-Class
SVM algorithm [169] over some random data, to perceive how the decision function build the
frontier and classify new data observations.
Figure 3.15: Novelty detection example over random data using One-Class Support Vector Machine
showing the learned frontier and the anomaly classification errors [177].
3.3.3 Performance evaluation
In the case of binary classification problems, some measures that reveal the model correctness
facing its predictions, in other words, metrics that tell the model performance. Focusing on a
binary classifier existing four possible predictions for a two-class problem:
• false positive
When the outcome is incorrectly classified as positive, when in fact belongs to a
negative example.
• false negative
When the classifier labeled as negative contrarily to the positive true class.
• true positive and true negative representing the correct classifications
Together they composed the confusion matrix, as described in Figure 3.16, which sum-
marizes the prediction results of the classifier. This is the base to empower more complex
performance measures.
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Positive Negative
Positive TP  FN  
Negative FP  TN  
Predicted Class
True Class True Positive
False Positive
False Negative
True Negative
Figure 3.16: Confusion matrix for a binary classifier, where the columns represents the classifier
prediction and the rows are the actual classes. This also can be empower in multiclass
problems, where the matrix grows proportionally.
The most common performance metric is the accuracy. It represents the fraction of
examples correctly classified. Looking to the confusion matrix is simply the sum of diagonals
divided by the total, forming the following equation 3.1:
Accuracy = TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN (3.1)
Despite accuracy being a straightforward metric, the first moment of evaluation should
focus on cross-validation (elucidated in Section 2.5.3). The model in each iteration is trained
with a training set’s percentage and tested against the test fold. This iterative process, not
only avoids biasing but also is useful to reveal the model’s learning behavioral by analyzing
various accuracies obtained at the end of each fold. For instance, cross-validation can elucidate
the training accuracy and the average of all accuracies, crucial to detect overfitting. Withal,
most real world datasets are unbalanced 3 and accuracy treats all examples as the same,
not taking into account the class proportion. Consequently, the majority class tends to
have high accuracy and the minority class, in its turn, smaller accuracy percentage. Thus,
cross-validation also is a good tool to overcome this problem, along with the implementation
of other metrics to computed the overall efficiency:
• Specificity
Expresses the fraction of negative examples properly classified, i.e., true negative
rate (equation 3.2)
Specificity = TN
TN + FP (3.2)
• Recall 4
3The number of positive events are not equal to the number of negative events.
4Or sensitivity
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Antagonistically to specificity, recall refers to the ratio of positive classifications
correctly classified - true positive rate (equation 3.3)
Recall = TP
TP + FN (3.3)
• Precision
Traduces the accuracy of the positive predictions. In other words, symbolizes the
current fraction of positive samples in the group that the classifier assigns as positive
(equation 3.4)
Precision = TP
TP + FP (3.4)
There is a direct correlation between precision and recall, establishing the precision/recall
tradeoff. This tradeoff indicates that a classifier can not have elevated values of precision and
recall at the same time: increasing precision reduces recall and vice versa. So, it helps to
balance between the extremes, being the calibration dependent on the objective of the system.
As the context of this work is to detect an anomaly, a system with high precision and low
recall are preferred, predicting positive only when very sure, instead of predicting everything
as positive.
Also, these performance metrics are also related to the f-measure (described by Equation
3.5). It is called as the harmonic mean of precision and recall [126] because gives more weight
to low values, instead of treating equally all values, and for that reason, it is a good way for
comparing two classifiers.
F −measure = 2 ∗Recall ∗ Precison
Recall + Precison (3.5)
confusion matrix should always be taken in attention, as it is the core for execute all this
evaluation measures. Moreover, ROC curve is another way to evaluate a classifier. It is
very similar to the precision/recall tradeoff, but ROC curve designs the true positive rate
against the false positive rate 5. Comparing various ROC curves performed by different ML
algorithms empowers a straightforward way to compare the classifiers performance in detection
of anomalies.
5The ratio of negative instances that are incorrectly classified as positive, and it is equal to 1− the true
negative rate, i.e., 1− specificity [126]
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Figure 3.17: ROC curve for binary SVM classification using the IRIS dataset [178]. It feature true
positive rate on the Y axis, and false positive rate on the X axis.
Once again there is a tradeoff: the higher the recall (corresponding to TPR), the more
false positives (FPR) the classifier produces. As represented in Figure 3.17, the dotted line
represents the ROC curve of a purely random classifier, for which a good classifier should
be far. The optimal point is the top left corner where false positive rate is zero and the
true positive rate is one. Furthermore, measure Area Under the Curve (AUC) permits to
compare classifiers. A perfect classifier will have a ROC AUC equal to 1, contrarily, a purely
random classifier will have a ROC AUC equal to 0.5 (similar to the ROC AUC for the class 1
illustrated in Figure 3.17).
3.4 Conclusion
In conclusion, although each corporate network environment has its own characteristics making
each case unique, the described methodology in this chapter, is a generic process that can
be extended for other dissimilar and more complex scenarios. It starts by monitoring and
gathering network data, passing by the feature engineering and ending with the knowledge
extraction. It is mainly designed to build an inner-network communication profile and
detect outliers behaviors by actively monitoring the network and employing machine learning
techniques.
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CHAPTER 4
Proof of Concept Scenario and
Results
Tis chapter describes the used scenario, along with the explanation of how network data is
created. A briefly overview of the dataset is given and the described ML algorithms of this
dissertation are tested, applying the proposed evaluation metrics. The adoption of actual and
suitable attack vectors to generate and analyze the ML anomaly detection capability, marks
this proof of concept.
4.1 Network data generation
As discussed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation aims to detect propagation movements and
data leakage in a corporate environment. Intending to be more similar as possible from an
organization network domain, a network scenario was designed in GNS3 1 which was used
to simulate the propagation and data exfiltration incursions. Evidently that this topology is
far from a real corporate network, however, was built taking into account the architectural
principles explained in Section 2.1.1. It has three layers - Access, Distribution, and Core;
being implemented VLAN segmentation at access layer (as shown in Figure 4.1) and are
constituted by the following machines:
• VLAN 1:
– win7-2: Windows 7 machine.
• VLAN 2:
– win7-1: Windows 7 machine.
• VLAN 3:
– win7-3 and win7-4: Windows 7 machines
– ubuntu-1: Ubunutu machine that represents the contaminated enterprise host.
1Network software simulator
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The focus of this work is to deal with a scenario where a machine is already infected
and compromised, and not targeting the previous moment before the corruption. This is
the starting point of the detection. Therefore, to build a system that learns form network
observations to find deviations from the normal behavior, it is required the creation of
propagation and data leakage attack vectors to "fabricate" the network data that will be
provided to the ML models. So, this matches with a classification problem (supervised
learning) as argued in Section 2.5.3, is necessary to assemble network examples for normal
and uncommon traffic. In sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.1 will be explained the data network process
creation for propagation and data exfiltration cases, respectively.
Figure 4.1: Network topology for a controlled simulation. It has organized into Access, Distribution
and Core layers. The access layer represents the internal corporate network, which is
structured by three distinctly VLAN. In right side is represented the external network,
outside of corporation borders. This is a simple and fully connected network only to
simulation intent, not having been considerate the redundancy and resilience aspects.
4.1.1 Propagation data production
4.1.1.1 Abnormal activity
Wannacry and NotPetya ransomwares were the major attacks that start to benefit from the
NSA exploitation tools, as already argued in Section 2.3. Both use Eternalblue exploit for
lateral movement, and in this work, was pretended that propagation attack was identical as
close as possible to the spreading method of these attacks.
Eternalblue 2 targets machines prior to some Windows 7 versions [84]. These machines
contain an interprocess communication share (IPC$) that allows a null session. That means,
2CVE-2017-0144 vulnerability in MS17-010
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the connection is established via anonymous login and a null session is permitted by default,
approving the client to send different commands to the server (notice that SMB has a client-
server architecture 2.1.2). This is one of Eternalblue’s bugs and vulnerabilities that are
elucidated by CheckPoint’s researches in [179] revealing the SMB exposure. In this way,
a Thai security researcher, Worawit Wang 3 implemented a proof of concept of MS17-010
vulnerabilities, making the code available in their github repository [180]. The Wang’s
repository referenced by [181], [182] was used to carry out the Eternablue exploit in this
dissertation. However, some changes were made to the original version. Worawit’s Eternalblue
exploit only targets and infects one specific machine defined by an introduced IP address. To
simulate a lateral movement in the network was added some extra functionalities. It will be
described below by order of events:
1. Depending of the wanted network range, the script performs a scan over all IP addresses
in the defined network mask. Thus, the infected machine starts sending ping commands
to the IP addresses to check the active machines.
2. After found the up hosts, verifies if the target is MS17-010 patched or not, using an
auxiliary script provided by Worawit. In the positive case, the infection proceeds.
3. Then, it is used the port scanner of nmap to validate if the machine has the TCP 445
port opened.
4. Having all victims, the script starts to launch the Eternablue exploit sequentially to all
machines, spreading across the LAN.
Furthermore, to make the attack more realistic and closer to the human behavior, the
inactivity time is defined by random numbers from the exponential distribution, where the
mean parameter is changed after every attempt to infect a machine. This procedure aims
to increase the generated data quality, establishing an activity frequency antagonistic to a
bot or machine (which acts periodically), and forming a more robust attack vector capable of
challenging the ML classifiers performance. Along with these lines, three types of attack mode
were conceived. So, thinking in a scale of action’s speed, two of them are in opposite ends (the
faster and the slowest extremes), and the third, in a medium-term between them. Regarding
the quicker fashion, the network scan is performed over a reduced number of IP addresses, and
it is characterized by performing an intrusive outbreak. Diversely, the slowest one carries out
a deep scan over the LAN and the exploit launching takes a careful and discrete action. In its
turn, the medium type empowers an intermediate level between an aggressive and cautious
disruption. Just so, infections were launched among the three VLANs, being their ferocity
defined by the mean values used to produce the silence period, where high mean values form
long periods of inactivity, shaping a more human style.
Notice that, for security questions, all this infecting process were done in the GNS3 network
(Figure 4.1) without any connection to the Internet. Also, as the goal is to generate network
traffic after the machine was compromised, the internal malware execution is out of the scope
of this dissertation, therefore was not performed.
3Designated as _sleepya on Twitter
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4.1.1.2 Normal activity
Once will be utilized classification ML algorithms, it is needed the creation of network traffic
that represents the normal action of machines in the network. In the corporate simulation
network, each VLAN is composed of machines with Windows 7 operation system. As seen in
Section 2.1.2, SMB is the protocol used by Windows machines for providing shared access to
files between nodes on a network. Following this lines, machine win7-2 has a shared folder
with all the others Windows machines (win7-1, win7-3 and win7-4). Moreover, to produce
natural behavior, regular file and directory actions like upload, delete and copy, were made by
each machine over the created shared folder. At a network level, this activity is translated into
TCP traffic for port 445, being the exchanged data volume conditioned by the file/directory
size. This way, the three presented actions can be established using distinct dynamics, that
are responsible for regulating either the files/directories size as the activity times, which
delineated the action signature. Once again the silence periods are described by random
numbers with an exponential distribution, in order to formulate network observations identical
to those produced by a human user. Also, in spite of not create a repetitive pattern concerning
the volume of bytes transferred in the internal network, file size variance was introduced by
executing actions that deal with different file size magnitudes: KB, MB, and GB.
4.1.2 Exfiltration data production
At an organizational level, as explained in Section 2.1, there are policies that define what
services are allowed or not. In this Proof of Concept, relatively to the exfiltration case, was
assumed that only the 22, 80 and 443 TCP ports are tolerated by the company, corresponding
to SSH and file transfers (e.g., SCP), HTTP and HTTPS protocols, respectively. In this way,
was elaborated leakage attacks using these three protocols for forwarding data outside of
enterprise borders, but first will be elucidated how normal traffic was established.
4.1.2.1 Normal activity
The method used to find the normal activity profile was the same for SCP, HTTP, and
HTTPS protocols, albeit, for simplicity on explanation, will be elucidated in detail for the
HTTPS case. Being the previous ports allowed by the enterprise, corporation users can then
use several services that run over those protocols for transfer and share files over the network.
Over a while, arbitrary uploads of files with different sizes were performed (from 100 KB to
500 MB) for Google Drive 4 along with usual browsing (social networks and googling). These
actions aim to represent the typical habits of a regular company user. From the network
observations caused by these actions, it was plotted a graphic that displays the number of
upload bytes per second, to understand their network behavior. The result of this process is
represented in Figure 4.2.
4File storage and synchronization service developed by Google that enables synchronization among different
devices and file sharing operations
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Figure 4.2: Plotted graphic that illustrates the relation of number of bytes transfered per second,
collected from a sample of the upload activity made to Google Drive
Therefore, from graphic analysis the following features were extracted to trace the profile
of HTTPS normal activity:
• Peaks amplitude (PK): The amplitude, that is, the y-value, representing the maxi-
mum number of bytes that can be sent. It acts as a threshold of bytes.
• Peaks duration (PD): This shows the period of activity, i.e., how long the user was
uploading files.
• Interval between peaks (SP): The interval between peaks, contrarily to the activity
period, traduces the inactivity time, the silence periods.
These three metrics were organized on a tuple where each entry represents the associated
feature - [PK, PD, SP] 5. Considering the total time of activity, several tuples were formatted
and, posteriorly, handled by the script responsible for simulating the obtained profile. In such
way, was used the Google Drive API to perform uploads of files without human supervision
on the following mode: every time that an upload is executed, one of the tuples is randomly
selected, assuming a discrete probability distribution, to get the maximum of bytes allowed,
the time of activity and silence period. Surely, this process is influenced by the initial sequence
of files uploaded and by the network performance, but the goal is to build a more reliable
normal profile close to human behavior. To point out once more, that the same examination
was shaped by the other protocols using an equal range of file sizes, but instead of being
used the Google Drive API to perform uploads, regarding to HTTP case, was empowered the
Requests’s python library [183] to execute GET and POST demands to several sites that still
5Where PK corresponds to the peak amplitude, PD the peak duration and SP the silence period
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not had the newest security feature implemented by the SSL/TLS protocol. Regarding the
SCP, the file synchronization was done using the scp’s python library [184].
4.1.2.2 Abnormal activity
To carry out the data leakage outbreak it was assumed that the ubuntu-1 machine in the
simulation network environment is contaminated. After the infection, it could be controlled
to sent confidential data to the exterior of the internal network. In this fashion, as already
said, in this Proof of Concept, the allowed and, supposed, trustworthy enterprise protocols
were used to mask the data exfiltration movement. So, similarly to the data propagation
production, is intended that all data exfiltration actions be, as far as possible, unrelated to a
behavior addressed by a machine. In such manner, the activity time is always set to a different
value comprised in an exponential distribution, ensuring that are not periodic actions. All the
dynamics conceived for the three protocols (which will be described throughout this section)
were elaborated taking into account the normal profile associated with each one, varying the
sent volume of data send and the period of inactivity.
Beginning by the anomalous SCP attack vector, it was simulated on GNS3, using the
machine placed on the external network (Figure 4.1) representing the outside attacker’s
machine. Thus, through a file transfer script (using scp’s python library [184]), ubuntu-1 host
forwards data to the external peer, using one of the six different dynamics described in Table
4.1.
Table 4.1: Description of the empowered dynamics to leak data over SCP channel, showing from
stealthy dynamics to more intrusive ones.
Dynamic File size range (KB) Mean inactivity maximum value (seconds)
1 6 - 60 50
2 10 - 30 60
3 70 - 500 100
4 80 - 10240 200
5 900 - 3072 150
6 10240 - 1048576 250
So, the above SCP’s dynamics are characterized by two variables, the upper and lower size
limits of the data leaked and the maximum number that can be assigned to the exponential
distribution mean parameter. More precisely, the mean inactivity maximum value delineates
the inaction duration, where a random number (limited by the maximum established) are
attributed to the mean, making it always different. The combination of these two metrics
intents to define the intrusion degree of an attack, where large sizes are followed by high mean
values (i.e., more extended periods of silence). For instance, dynamic 1, characterized by
small data volume and mean value, performs a more intrusive leakage than the dynamic 6,
which deals with Mb and higher silence values, assuming a more restrained action mode.
Moreover, regarding HTTP and HTTPS, the external machine in GNS3 was not used.
Instead, the ubuntu-1 host already has Internet connection available, and it can communicate
with external IP addresses and services. To leak information using the HTTP protocol
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were sent elementary POST 6 carrying data to websites that still do not support SSL/TLS
encryption. In the same way that SCP abnormal activity, was created six HTTP dynamics
shown in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Summary of the distinct dynamics created to perform poisonous POST (via HTTP channel)
containing confidential information transfered to the company outside.
Dynamic File size range (KB) Mean inactivity maximum value (seconds)
1 10 - 40 40
2 20 - 80 80
3 70 - 800 100
4 100 - 1024 150
5 900 - 3072 150
6 10240 - 1048576 200
Same as the SCP’s dynamics table defined in Table 4.1, the above HTTP’s dynamics are
ruled by the same goal: make incursions more and less stealthy and shaping a non-periodic
distribution.
Steganography, the practice of concealing a file (such a text file, image or video) into
another file, as shown in Section 2.3.5, is a way to camouflage confidential information or
malware code inside a trivial image (or in a video file) being unnoticed by the human eye. In
this dissertation, this technique was employed to simulate data exfiltration, since it is one
method practiced and increasingly used by real attackers [185] that goes unnoticed by the
security alarms, making the attack vector more realistic and closer to being a real incursion.
In this manner, to put it into practice, it was used the nukeop’s github repository [186] that
implements a steganography’s program, encoding files into images. The program transforms
the wanted file into bytes that are separated into 2-bit sequences. Since every pixel has four
channels (RGBA), and each channel uses 8 bits for its value, in the case of having an image
with the following dimension, 1764 ∗ 1797, it is possible to hide a file with size less than or
equal to 12,6 MB. Moreover, before being applied the steganography’s process, the file is
encoded to base64 (converted to binary), to decrease its size and producing a final image
indistinguishable from the original one. Hosting the ultimate image metadata information
just need to send the data. Being the traffic to/from TCP 443 port allowed, the poisonous
images are transmitted and posted on Twitter (that uses HTTPS for secure communication
over the Internet). So, what seems to be normal tweets are, in fact, a data leaked outbreak.
In order to perform the images uploads was used the Twitter’s API through a python wrapper
- Twython [186]. Although, as described on Twitter documentation, it restricts the image size
to 5 MB and only 2,400 tweets per day. Due to these limitations, the image size that would
be applied to the steganography process was carefully chosen, conditioning the volume of data
handling by the attacks dynamics. Along these lines, only two dynamics were fabricated, as
described in Table 4.3, where the dynamic 1 is more invasive than the dynamic 2.
6Using the Requests’s python library
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Table 4.3: Definition of the steganography’s attack vector dynamics that hide private company
data inside a normal image and publish in Twitter by taking advantage of the HTTPS
encryption features.
Dynamic File size range (KB) Mean inactivity maximum value (seconds)
1 0 - 10 60
2 50 - 600 100
4.2 Network Data Collection and Processing
As discussed in Section 3.1, the installation of a sniffer on every endpoint probably is
undesirable. Thus, the place where it is allocated is decisive. Being dependent of the problem
in question and looking to the existing monitoring tools (discussed in Section 2.4), in this case
of study, the network data was captured at the switch level, making possible the aggregation
of all data that flows on a LAN. Hence, Wireshark software was used in GNS3 for sniffing
the switch interface connected to the distribution layer (Figure 4.1). In case the machine
has Internet connection. Instead, it was deployed a sniffer on the host, capturing all data in
the wireless interface. In both sniffer implementations, the captured raw data was stored on
PCAP files. Therefore, in the scope of this dissertation, sniffers do not have any processing
capabilities. That means the PCAP capture grasping by the sniffer is composed of raw data.
So, it is required to transform raw data into meaningful statistical information. Also, if
the ML model took raw data as input, it will increase the complexity of the ML algorithm,
generating worse result accomplished with prolonged calculations.
4.2.1 Parsing process
After collecting and save network data traffic on a PCAP file, packets must to be parsed for
extract meaningful information. As described in Section 2.4 most of the network traffic are
abide by TCP, UDP and ICMP protocols, and in light of this work, network data will be
filtered by TCP and UDP transport protocols, take the coming attributes from the 1 to the 4
layers of the OSI model:
• Layer 1 to 3:
– Source and destination IP addresses
– Volume of bytes
– Unix epoch time
– VLAN ID
• Layer 4:
– TCP
∗ source and destinations ports
∗ SYN and ACK flags
– UDP
∗ source and destinations ports
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For each dissected packet it is possible to know the packet direction (internal or external),
once the range of a private network is defined by the VLAN 1 to 3 subnetworks (and the
subsequent packet will be associated by the VLAN ID), being all the rest considered public
network. In this way, packet attributes and the activity time (the difference between the
timestamp of the first and last packet) are used and consumed to build the network attributes,
composing the next step - the transformation of packets into samples 4.2.2.
Moreover, it is important to have in consideration that with a large amount of collected data
in network corporations, and ambitioned a near real-time system detection, the performance
of parsing process is crucial. Thus, in order to achieve faster processing and scalability, Kaitai
Struct [187] was used for packet dissection. a C++ compiler forms it, surpassed any other
python dissection framework, being able to process on average 31.00 packets per second, when
used Python version 3.5.1 [188].
4.2.2 Converting packets into samples
In Section 3.2 it was generically explained a possible process to extract network observations
from raw data, that in this work, was addressed as a recipe for converting packets into features.
Thus, in the first step, described in 3.2.1, counting metrics are computed over a sampling
window. Notice that, this is only the initial step, where the samples still do not represent
network observations, being necessary advance to the next stage, 3.2.2, where features are
defined and ready to be used in order to build a profile.
Therefore, propagation infection and data exfiltration incursions are two dissimilar situa-
tions, and for this reason, each one had a feature extraction process based on its characteristics,
which will be described separately.
4.2.2.1 Propagation case
For the lateral movement threat, the formed attributes from the applied statistical processing
over the metadata are described in Table 4.4 bellow:
Table 4.4: Low level description of the attributes defined in each sampling window for the propagation
scenario considering now a creation of a more generic system
Sample attributes Description
ip_internal Number of internal IP addresses contacted
internal_bytes_up Total number of internal bytes uploaded
internal_bytes_down Total number of internal bytes downloaded
packet_count Number of packets transmitted and received
tcp_sessions Number of established TCP sessions
The normal behavior of a spreading force is to start contacting atypical and unusual
machines, verifying an increase of observed IP addresses along with the variance. This is the
reason for the ip_internal choose. Furthermore, internal_bytes_up and internal_bytes_down
attributes traduce the volume of data uploaded/downloaded on the internal network, that
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is, the sum of exchanged data among VLAN 1, VLAN 2 and VLAN 3. Both are used to
expressed modifications of the internal pattern volume. For instance, a ransomware charge,
after being dispersed on the network and gained access to enterprise NAS/SAN, will start to
encrypt all the documents, provoking a hike of internal data volume. Besides, it provides a
way to control changes from the upload/download rate of end hosts. Moreover, since it was
utilized the SMB vulnerability to fabricate the propagation action (4.1.1), a good strategy
goes through counting the TCP opened sessions to port 445. Firstly, because SMB file sharing
protocol, that is being used by the Eternalblue runs over TCP on port 445. Secondly, by
observation of the network behavioral produced by the attacker vector, it was verified that the
Eternalblue exploitation establishes multiples TCP session over the time. However, to make
the system more generic, in order to be applicable in different anomalous network situations
and not be dependent of an attack vector, instead of controlling the number of TCP sessions
for a specific port (the 445 port), this Proof of Concept is counting the overall TCP sessions.
In this way, the attributes selection are less depending on the attack vector action mode.
It is essential to clarify how the number of TCP sessions was counted. TCP is connection-
oriented, that is, before any data can be transmitted, a reliable connection must be obtained
and acknowledged. This represents the TCP three-way handshake. For example, machine
win7-2 wants to talk with win7-1 machine, so TCP creates a source port that interacts with a
well-known port. Only after the three messages SYN, SYN-ACK, ACK have been transmitted
(as demonstrated in Figure 4.3)the TCP session is established and win7-2 is allowed to
communicate with win7-1. As discussed in Section 3.2, packets can be aggregated by the
source IP address and the destination port, forming the notion of data stream aggregation. In
this way, every time that an ACK flag is verified for a specific data stream, the number of the
TCP session is incremented.
Connection
established
SYN
SYN / ACK
ACK
Figure 4.3: Representation of TCP three-way handshake. Only after the 3 steps are completed is
that the connection can be established, creating a TCP session between two hosts.
Finally, the packet_count attribute, counts all the packets received and transmitted during
the sampling windows time, allowing to distinguish periodic communications and understand
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the silence periods, that are computed, posteriorly, inside of each sliding window.
4.2.2.2 Data exiltration case
In data exfiltration scene the concern is now direct to the external network. The sample
attributes have to describe the egress flow of data and they are described in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Low level description of the attributes defined in each sampling window for the data
exfiltration scenario
Sample attributes Description
ip_external Number of external IPs contacted
external_bytes_up Total number of external bytes uploaded
external_bytes_down Total number of external bytes downloaded
packet_count Number of packets transmitted and received
tcp_sessions_22 Number of TCP sessions established to port 22
tcp_sessions_80 Number of TCP sessions established to port 80
tcp_sessions_443 Number of TCP sessions established to port 443
tcp_sessions_other Number of TCP sessions established to other ports
The reason of each one is:
• ip_external
The number of external IP addresses contacted allows detecting an internal endpoint
that initiates a weirded activity by starting to contacting external peers, where its
normal behavior is communicating with other inside hosts. For instance, setting up
unusual connections to an FTP server placed on the outside network.
• external_bytes_up and external_bytes_down
The volume of data uploaded/downloaded to the foreign network, likewise in prop-
agation case, depicts the abnormal amount of data send to outside and variations in
upload/download peer ration.
• tcp_sessions
In the leakage data scenario, only SCP, HTTP and HTTPS services are allowed.
So, by counting the number of sessions to ports 22, 80, 443, can exhibit an irregular
increase of established sessions to an external IP address, where a conversation hike
could mean a rise in data sent between peers. On the other hand, by counting the
number of TCP sessions to the forbidden ports, illicit irruptions could be pointed. Notice
that, to calculate the number TCP sessions it was used the same strategy described on
propagation case (4.2.2.2). Yet, in this situation, TCP sessions are defined in function
of the port number, once only this application ports had permissions to pass through
the enterprise firewall.
4.2.3 Network features formation
Of the first layer of computation (i.e., the counters generation) resulted in 6 and 8 samples for
the propagation and the exfiltration case, respectively. Moreover, taking into consideration
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the sampling time window assumptions described in Section 3.2.1, it was adopted an interval
of 1 second, allowing the detection of periodic events and a faster decision response. Yet,
the attributes computed in each sampling window required to be transformed into valuable
observations that represented the network activity. In this way, inside of each sliding window
was made the feature computation, as described in Section 3.2.2, where average, median,
variance, kurtosis and skewness were calculated over every column, producing 30 and 40
time-independent features, for the propagation and data exfiltration case. Furthermore, also
was included the number of silent periods (interval of time defined by the sliding window
where the number of packets is zero) and the average duration of these periods. Both of
them are linked to network traffic activity, being an added value to distinguish human from
machine behavioral and to draw a more reliable network profile (once a host had periods of
inactivity). Similar to the sampling window and as discussed in Section 3.2.2, the sliding
window dimension should be carefully chosen. In order to obtain a nearer real-time response
time without compromising the system’s detectability, was empowered a 2 minutes sliding
window with a shit time of 5 seconds.
The final feature observations are formed, missing only the categorization of each observa-
tion. Being the samples stored in a matrix, the labeling process becomes easy to implement,
assigning the known label for each entry. At this moment, data is ready to step into the
pipeline and be consumed by classifiers to disclose unnoticed pattern and forming a profile
capable of detect patterns deviations.
4.3 Dataset composition
Since there are two distinctive scenarios, each had its dataset. The number of packets, filtered
by TCP and UDP protocols, for the propagation case are illustrated in Figure 4.4. It is
notorious the high discrepancy between the number of normal packets and the number of
packets generated by the attack vector. Although the propagation attack vector has several
dynamics, it acts fast, i.e., from the moment that it can access another host, the exploitation
process is spontaneous, being the exchange amount of data dependent of the malicious payload
carried by the attack.
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Figure 4.4: Number of normal and abnormal observations that form the propagation’s dataset
Regarding the data exfiltration dataset, Figure 4.5 shows the number of packets produced
by the three attacks vectors, as well, the normal packets associated with each traffic (HTTP,
HTTPS, and SCP). From its analysis, what stands out is the reduced number of packets
generated by the HTTP abnormal activity. The imposed limit on the data size that can be
sent using the Twiiter API (as discussed in 4.1.2) may be the reason for these reduced number
of packets.
Figure 4.5: Number of normal and abnormal observations relating to the two subsets of data that
form the data exfitration scenario.
Following the guidelines described in Section 3.2.4, Figure 4.6 depicts the number of
observations resulted after the sliding window strategy, that means, the number of instance
per label. However, the data exfiltration scenario is structured by two subsets of network
observations:
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• SCP dataset (SCP_D)
Defined by file transference normal activity and by SCP attack vector actions,
described in Section 4.1.
• HTTP dataset (HTTP_D)
In this case, the data related to normal and abnormal HTTP and HTTPS activities
are combined into a single dataset.
The adopted arrangement aims to simplify the complexity of the problem, as discussed in
Section 3.3.2, facilitating the ML classifiers action. In such way, the data exfiltration case
was broken into tree binary problems constituted by the SCP_D, HTTP_D and a dataset
formed by the junction of the last ones, where normal observations are identified with label 0,
whereas anomalous observations(SCP_D + HTTP_D) are identified with label 1.
Figure 4.6: Number of network observations generated after the sliding window process, both for the
propagation and for the three data exfiltration cases.
From Figure 4.6, it is possible to observe that all datasets are balanced, having a number
of normal observations similar to the number of abnormal observations.
According to the guidelines described in Section 3.2.4, another quick way to get an overview
of the data that forms a dataset is to plot a histogram. Figure 4.7 shows the representation
of some features related to the SCP_D, HTTP_D. From it analyzes, is visible that in both
datasets, attributes have different scales, being an indication for the feature scaling process.
On the other hand, it is possible to build a pattern comparing the SCP_D and HTTP_D
data for the illustrated features. For instance, looking for the SCP_D, it presents a more
disperse and frequent distribution in relation to the variance of upload bytes to an external
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IP address. Contrarily, for the silence duration, it is visible the absence of periods of silence,
concluding that the SCP_D subset exhibit major periods of activity.
Figure 4.7: Histogram of some features from SCP_D and HTTP_D observations.
An additional approach to have a more concrete perspective of the overall dataset is the
PCA analysis, as explained in Section 3.3.1.2. Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9 plot the cumulative
explained variance ratio as a function of the number of components, for the propagation and
data exfiltration cases, respectively.
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Figure 4.8: Curve that estimate how many components are needed to describe the data over PCA
reductions without loss of information, for Propagation dataset
Figure 4.9: Curve that estimate how many components are needed to describe the data over PCA
reductions without loss of information for Data exfiltration dataset
Looking into the above figures, the ideal number of features that add up an explained
variance of 95% are described in Table 4.6. The ideal number of components resulted from
this analysis will be used in the classification methods, Section 4.4. Regarding the HTTP_D
it is possible to conclude that applying a two-dimensional projection, a lot of information is
lost, exhibiting an explained variance measured under of the 30%.
Table 4.6: Ideal number of components for each dataset when PCA reduction is realized
Dataset Ideal number of components
Propagation 9
SCP_D 7
HTTP_D 12
SCP_D + HTTP_D 15
4.4 Classification methods and evaluation
In this Proof of Concept it was studied the behavior of SVM, Adaboost, Gradient Boosting,
and NN classifiers (described in Section 3.3) over the two existing scenarios. For their
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implementation was used the Scikit-learn library, where before being put to the test, for each
one was obtained the best parameters. Once the parameters are influenced and dependent
on the provided data it is essential to tune the model to achieve better results. Yet, for
SVM, due to resource and time complexity required to find the optimal parameters, a smooth
process was adopted. Regarding the ensemble methods employed (i.e., Adaboost and Gradient
Boosting), among the existing parameters, was given special attention to the tree-specific
parameter, max_depth, and the boosting parameters, learning_rate, and n_estimators . Once
both boosting implementations are based on decision trees, it is necessary the supervision
of the tree depth (through the max_depth parameter) to control over-fitting. Also, the
learning_rate parameter exposes the impact of each tree on the final outcome. For instance,
a low value will need more trees in the ensemble to fit the training set, but the predictions
will usually generalize better being computationally more expensive [126]. Further, it is
highly correlated with n_estimators (which defines the number of sequential trees to be
modeled) being necessary tuned according to the learning_rate value. Regarding NN, only
was considered one layer on its implementation, not been studied the Deep learning field [189].
Moreover, it is important to highlight that for every model it was used the ideal number
of components (as described the computation process in Section 4.3) to perform component
reduction, applying PCA reduction.
4.4.1 Propagation scenario
Relatively to the lateral movement case, for an ideal number of features equals to 9, in general,
all the classifiers had high accuracies as demonstrated in Table 4.7, being the SVM the worst
and Gradient Boosting the best one. The presented results were computed using Stratified
10-fold cross-validation, guaranteeing that evaluation is made using the different combinations
of training and classification folds. This is an expected result, once ensemble methods by
combining a set of weak learners, normally generalize better than a single classifier, and NN
is known to perform well even on complex tasks. On the other hand, even the SVM shows
very good accuracies using a linear kernel for training, allowing to infer that data is linearly
separable.
Table 4.7: Accuracy results for each classifier algorithm in the propagation scenario.
Classifier Accuracy
SVM 0.962 ± 0.0215
AdaBoost 0.993 ± 0.0128
Gradient Boosting 0.994 ± 0.0086
Neural Networks 0.993 ± 0.0112
As argued in Section 3.3.3, the main evaluation element that allows interpret the overall
performance of a classifier is the confusion matrix. Figure 4.10 represents the confusion matrix
for the SVM and Gradient Boosting, respectively.
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Figure 4.10: Normalized confusion matrix for Support Vector Machine, on the left, and for Gradient
Boosting algorithm, on the right side. It displays the miss classifications of the True
label to the Predicted label for both Support Vector Machine and Gradient Boosting
cases.
Looking for the diagonal elements with darker colors (which represent the correct classifi-
cations), the SVM algorithm performs worst, once the Normal label was 36 times classified as
Abnormal, meaning the presence of False Positives. While in Gradient Boosting, the error
decrease to 1% (only 3 False Positives), having in always a better prediction.
Moreover, it is important to perceive how the model performs in the training and validation
data. In this way, Figure 4.11 plots the learning curve for the SVM and Gradient Boosting,
showing the model’s performance on the training set and the validation set as a function of
the training set size.
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Figure 4.11: Learning curve for the Support Vector Machine and Gradient Boosting classifiers. It
shows the validation and training score of an estimator for varying numbers of training
samples being essential to understand if models benefit from adding more training data.
From its analysis, the first conclusion is that the Gradient Boosting generalization is
superior to the SVM generalization, once the last model reaches 0.95 as the maximum score.
Second, about Gradient Boosting, it is possible to infer that the model needs, at least, 800
training samples (approximately) to reach the maximum score and make a better generalization.
Unlike the SVM, that both the training and validation scores from the beginning were closed
to the maximum. Further, the learning curve can provide a way to verify if the model is over
or underfitting by inspecting the gap between the training and validation score. For both
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models, that discrepancy it is not visible, once the curves practically match with each other,
having a similar performance on training and validation data. At last, since the two scores
have already converged to the maximum value, it is valid to conclude that for the provided
amount of training examples both models generalize correctly. Yet, in SVM there is space for
improvement if more training data was added, in opposition to Gradient Boosting, that more
data will not increase the predictor generalization. The SVM upgrade margin can be justified
by the superficial search process made for this algorithm parameters, as discussed above in
this section.
Additionally, in order to prove the model’s generalization in new data, an extra set of
data containing observations which are not part of the dataset used to train the model was
generated. As explained in Section 4.1.1, Worawit’s github was chosen to create the data
related to the propagation scenario, however, for the extra data formation was employed the
FuzzBunch framework that is one of the elements leaked by ShadowBrokers [190]. It can be
compared to MetaSploit [191] but written in Python, where provides several ready to use
Window’s exploits. Using the GNS3 simulation environment, the Eternalblue exploit (using
the FuzzBunch framework) was launched and spread across the LAN. In this way, the built
Gradient Boosting model was applied over the new propagation observations, obtaining an
accuracy of 0.839. This result traduces the good generalization capability offered by the
trained model over data that it never saw.
4.4.2 Data exfiltration scenario
Being the classifiers objective to discern between anomaly and normality, and as explained
in Sections 3.2.4 and 4.3, the data exfiltration scenario was divided into tree sub-cases
treated as binary predictions, in order to study the influence of the problem complexity on
the performance of the classifiers, by combining the two anomalous data types (SCP_D
and HTTP_D) into one. Along these lines, firstly will be analyzed the anomaly detection
performance on the individual cases, as the Table 4.8 exposes, being the results calculated
using Stratified 10-fold cross-validation.
Table 4.8: Accuracy results obtained from the follow predictors regarding the SCP_D and HTTP_D
data.
Classifier Accuracy for SCP_D Accuracy for HTTP_D
SVM 0.837 ± 0.044 0.901 ± 0.0243
AdaBoost 0.938 ± 0.0157 0.997 ± 0.0049
Gradient Boosting 0.934 ± 0.0406 0.996 ± 0.0050
Neural Networks 0.868 ± 0.0338 0.989 ± 0.0093
From the above presented Table, once again SVM is the classifier with lower accuracies,
as well the ensemble predictors maintained the high performance already registered for the
propagation scenario. SVM’s accuracy for SCP_D, suggests that SCP observations are not
linearly separable, as can be justified by the Figure 4.12.
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Figure 4.12: Visualization of SVM’s C parameter separation margin and the presence of outliers in
such partition, showing that SCP_D data is not linearly separable.
Plotting data reducing the features to 2 dimensions using PCA, demonstrating that varying
the frontier margins, data is not easily separable, being visible the outliers existence for all
margin alternatives. Yet, increasing the number of components, the nature of observations
could be more distinguishable, but in the same way, not being totally separable.
Moreover, NN’s accuracy results for the SCP_D are unexpected. By interpreting the left
plot of Figure 4.13 is visible that the NN algorithm already had converged to the maximum
score, not having room to introduce significant improvements.
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Figure 4.13: Learning curve for the Neural Networks and Adaboost classifiers regarding to the
SCP_D data.
These surprising results could be related to the use of only one layer in NN for the training,
but a more in-depth analysis is needed to justify this statement. Also, despite Adaboost being
the more accurate predictor, in the SCP_D case, it is possible to enhance the performance by
including more examples for training the model, as the right learning curve plot illustrates.
Regarding HTTP_D binary classification predicted by the two poor algorithms, if an
activity is an irregularity or not, ROC curve for SVM, represented in the left side of Figure
4.14, shows that the true positive rate corner is around 0.15 false positive rate. On the other
hand, the right plot displays the NN’s ROC curve with a much more smother corner for the
optimal true positive rate, followed by a lower 0.1 false positive rate.
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Figure 4.14: ROC curve for Support Vector Machine (on the left) and Neural Networks (on the
right) with HTTP_D data, showing the compromise between the true positive and
false negative rate.
So, NN grants a more correct prediction of anomalies preserving the low false positive rate,
downsizing the normal actions classified as an abnormality, than SVM. This could be sustained
by the fact that SVM uses a linear kernel to make the data separation, while NN empowers a
more flexible decision function. Also, is remarkable the generalization ability provided by NN,
once it was not done an in-depth analysis of all the parameters, demonstrating the potential
of this algorithm.
When the SCP_D and HTTP_D are grouped into a single dataset where normal activity
has label 0, and both types of anomalies are assigned with label 1, the accuracies results
obtained, in general, are better than expected, as Table 4.9 shows, once the problem complexity
rise due to the non-differentiation between incursions types.
Table 4.9: Accuracies results obtained by the predictors when the two subsets of the data exfiltration
scenario are combine. Note that all results was measured using Stratified 10-fold validation.
Classifier Accuracy for SCP_D + HTTP_D
SVM 0.861 ± 0.0308
AdaBoost 0.972 ± 0.0125
Gradient Boosting 0.971 ± 0.0138
Neural Networks 0.929 ± 0.0240
Comparing the performance results of tables 4.8 and 4.9, Adaboost is the best predictor in
the three situations, yet on the SCP_D + HTTP_D data, the difference between Adaboost and
Gradient Boosting is insignificant. It is visible the good generalization achieved by Adaboost,
but as presented in Figure 4.15, the normalized confusion matrix shows the presence of 0.02%
of false positives, that is, 17 normal observations classified as anomalies, and contrarily, 0.04%
abnormal instances categorized as normal, resulting in 28 false negatives. In this way, it
is necessary to take into account the trade-off between false negatives and false positives
to enhance models rehabilitate. In addition, considering the performance results using the
Adaboost algorithm following a binary approach adopted in the two scenarios (model is fed
with all exfiltration network observations or by one attack vector observations), it is not
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conclusive to infer which of the approaches generalized better and prove the initial idea:
increased classification difficulty when combined various attack vectors; being necessary to
carry out more tests to clear up this situation.
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Figure 4.15: Adaabost’s confusion matrix for SCP_D + HTTP_D data exhibiting the false and
true negatives existence.
4.5 Conclusion
In conclusion, following the guideline detailed in the previous chapter, the results obtained
in this Proof of Concept demonstrated to be positive, with space to improve. The created
models demonstrated a good generalization capability using the specified features present on
the dataset built from numerous captures. However, some results need further research to
be interpreted. A real corporate network dataset would made the models more generic and
robust.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusions and Future work
Regarding the work done in this dissertation, security communications over Internet and the
protection of private assets are tightly linked. Network security topics are an increasingly
recurring theme, facing the number of breaches spoiled by companies. New types of tools and
mechanism are rising to audit the network welfare, being the monitoring of data needed to
improve the anomaly detection process. Looking for the data that flows through the network
borders it becomes essential to locate the threat before spreading and causing major damages,
mitigating the information disclosed and other severe impacts.
In view of the network data collection, the implementation strategy employed in this
work, regarding the used sniffer and its placement, is not the most desirable one, either in
terms of application or efficiency. In a real corporation network scenario, an implementation
with a port mirror or TAP, as described in section 2.4, is required facing the bulk of data
that enterprises deal every day. Other consideration, is the uselessness of the saved captures
after network traffic are gathered. This is only for academic purposes since in a production
environment, will cause problems related to the resource consumption and their protection
(another security concern). However, the analysis procedure over the raw data and, the
subsequent document-oriented storage, makes the system more scalable, not being required
extra software solutions like databases.
Due to the resource limitation, either at the software or hardware level, it was not possible
to create a network environment equal to a true company topology. The empowered proof of
concept scenario, described in section 4.1, was designed following the network architecture
principles, yet far from the real scenarios.
Concerning the network traffic generation topic performed in this dissertation, although
present-day attack vectors have been used to produce network data (likewise the Eternalblue
exploit and steganography’s techniques applied in social networks), data related to information
theft over SCP and propagation cases, were generated on a controlled simulation environment,
which may not traduce what really occurs in a enterprise network and influence the ML
classification results. Moreover, a more profound study and analysis over creation of the
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normal and anomalous actions should be done as future work, to trace a more reliable behavior.
Concerning feature extraction level (4.2.2), the set of features selected for both the
propagation and data exfiltration scenarios, proved to be sufficient for describing the network
state and to ML models get a good performance in the anomaly classification. All the feature
extraction phase were designed to be a general approach and not to cover only the particular
empowered attack vectors, being the developed system able to detect other variations of the
malicious outbreaks used in the Proof of Concept. Although this solution can be extended for
other scenarios and services, both for propagation and data leakage, by taking, for example,
other exfiltration methods that employ different network protocols (e.g., DNS, ICMP, FTP
and so one) as covert channels. Due to the objective segregation into two distinct cases, i.e.,
internal propagation and data exfiltration, it was not possible to implement all researched
possibilities for each domain, existing space to improve the current solution.
Taking into account the used of ML algorithms to differentiate between anomaly or not,
and considering all the took stages until the model performance evaluation, as described
in section 3.3, in general, for the two scenarios, the ensemble algorithms demonstrated a
better performance compared with the remaining. Supported by confusion matrix analyses,
Gradient Boosting is the model which better guarantees the compromise between having
high detectability and a small number of false positives, regrading to propagation’s context
(section 4.4.1). Beside that, this model proves its generalization competence being challenged
with new network observations, created by a variation of the attack vector used for training,
that clearly distance from those which compose the original dataset. For the data exfiltration
scenario (section 4.4.2) assisted by ROC curve and models accuracies, models also exposed
satisfactory results, being Adaboost algorithm the best predictor. Despite the good accuracies
and generalization obtained, it would be necessary test ML models with real company network
observations for a finer evaluation. Also, new benchmarks containing new ML algorithms
should be considered as future work. Additionally, it will be interesting take advantage of
the NN potential by adopting it, in order to evaluate the Deep Learning performance in the
anomaly classification.
In order to improve the network environment conceived, considering as future work other
equipments which are part of a company, for instance, printers, smart TVs, smartphones and
other IoT devices; instead of dealing only with host machines, will lead to creating a more
robust system.Under these additional network elements, the quantity and variety of traffic
that travels across network rise, and in this way, it’s possible to collect more significant data
and extrapolate learned patterns to future ones.
In favor of enhancing and making the feature extraction process more robust, other
elements should be recognized. Firstly, instead of only considering the number of established
TCP sessions, accounting also the re-connections, the failed attempts and the flag ration for
the data stream in question. Secondly, correlate the volume, number of packets, TCP/UDP
sessions, etc, to a specific IP or port could give a more detailed and low-level overview of
the network. Furthermore, for a better understanding of the silence periods distribution, the
variance of these inactivity periods should be included. Another improvement to be considered
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as future work is the inclusion of wavelets to examine the actions frequency, allowing the
models to cover periodicity aspects in the network patterns definition. Yet, it is always
important to have in mind that increasing the number of attributes will rise the final number
of features consumed by ML algorithms.
Furthermore, it would be advantageous the application of counter-measures after the
detection of an anomaly. Tracing back the irregularity origins, identifying the compromised
machines and isolating them from the rest of the network by applying network segregation
techniques or more drastically, block the IP address of the infected machines in the firewall,
it is a future work that would have high applicability in a real company. Complementary,
instead of just being considered the use of ML algorithms for anomaly detection, an additional
possible approach is to benefit from these new-fashioned methodologies to classify network
services, as some literature suggested [192]–[194]. The identification of HTTP, FTP, DNS
services, or even more ambitious, the recognition of encrypted data (for example, VoIP and
VPN traffic), by traffic observation could be extremely fruitful to extended network intrusion
detection strategies. However, privacy legal aspects rise with this type of deep inspection, as
debated in section 2.1.6.
All in all, companies spend absurd amounts of money to strengthen their security but,
increasingly are exposed to data breaches [195]. The current solutions that empower ML
capabilities are rising and overpower the existing traditional tools (some described in section
2.6), being necessary to emphasize that security breaches can be minimized, can be mitigated,
yet cannot be extinguished. Many legitimate security firms today offer services that can, at
very least, protect against well-known vulnerabilities, drawing products as if it were the best
and could combat all kinds of threats, leaving corporations susceptible. So, is this lack of
security that does huge damages to corporations caused by the absence of necessary means
or provoked by the "snake oil" products [196] sold by security vendors just to increase their
profits?
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